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1191 
GATEKEEPERS GONE WRONG: REFORMING 
THE CHAPTER 9 ELIGIBILITY RULES 
LAURA N. COORDES 
ABSTRACT 
In order to gain access to chapter 9 bankruptcy, municipalities must 
demonstrate that they meet several eligibility requirements. These 
requirements were put in place to prevent municipalities from making rash 
decisions about filing for bankruptcy. Too often, however, these 
requirements impede municipalities from attaining desperately needed 
relief. This Article demonstrates that as currently utilized, the chapter 9 
eligibility rules overemphasize deterrence and are not rationally connected 
to the reasons the chapter 9 bankruptcy system was developed. This Article 
therefore posits that the chapter 9 eligibility requirements should be 
relaxed. 
To support this claim, the Article conducts a detailed analysis of the 
history and theory of chapter 9 to determine the primary reasons for the 
eligibility rules and the core functions of a municipal bankruptcy solution. 
It then demonstrates how many of the concerns driving the eligibility rules’ 
existence are addressed in other chapter 9 mechanisms and proposes 
sweeping revisions to the eligibility rules to facilitate appropriate access to 
chapter 9. Specifically, municipalities in fiscal distress should be able to 
access bankruptcy when they demonstrate a need for the primary types of 
assistance that bankruptcy can best provide: nonconsensual debt 
adjustment, elimination of the holdout creditor problem, and breathing 
space. Through its analysis, this Article brings needed attention to the 
broader questions of who should have access to bankruptcy and when that 
access should be granted.  
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INTRODUCTION  
In December 2013, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes issued his 
decision that Detroit was eligible for bankruptcy under chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.1 Judge Rhodes’s ruling was significant for many reasons, 
not least because it allowed the largest municipal bankruptcy case in U.S. 
history to move forward. But Judge Rhodes also made a key observation 
when he issued his ruling: Detroit had waited too long to file for bankruptcy, 
filing long after it was in the city’s best fiscal interest to do so.2 As a 
consequence, Detroit residents and officials were suffering unnecessarily 
when they could have sought—and been granted—federal relief much 
earlier. 
Another city that Judge Rhodes could have had in mind when he made 
this observation was Atlantic City, New Jersey, which is facing some truly 
desperate times. The city’s $262 million budget has a $100 million deficit.3 
It owes about $400 million to its bondholders and casinos and has no 
concrete plan for making those payments.4 Although New Jersey recently 
provided Atlantic City with a rescue loan package, city officials had already 
begun delaying paychecks to workers to save up money to make debt 
payments, and the state’s repayment terms are particularly harsh.5 For the 
past ten years, Atlantic City has struggled with a rapidly shrinking property 
tax base, the closure of one third of its casinos, a sharp decline in gambling 
revenue, and fierce competition from new casinos in neighboring states.6 
Some city officials suggested that the city ought to file for bankruptcy; 7 yet, 
the years of decline Atlantic City has faced may mean that bankruptcy is no 
longer a viable option. Specifically, Atlantic City’s shrinking revenues and 
casino closures indicate that the city may not have adequate resources to 
 
 
 1. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 2. Chad Halcom, Judge Rhodes: Detroit Bankruptcy, Filed in Good Faith, Will Continue, 
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Dec. 4, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20131203/ 
NEWS/131209960/judge-rhodes-detroit-bankruptcy-filed-in-good-faith-will-continue (noting that 
Judge Rhodes stated “that debtors in bankruptcy court often wait longer to file than is in their own fiscal 
interests” and “Detroit is no exception.”). 
 3. Salvador Rizzo, Even with Cash from the State, Bankruptcy is Still a Threat to Atlantic City, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM (June 5, 2016, 4:52 PM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/even-with-cash-from-
the-state-bankruptcy-is-still-a-threat-to-atlantic-city-1.1610728. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.; see also Frank Shafroth, The Challenges of Intergovernmental Relations in Insolvency, 
GMU MUNICIPAL SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2016), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/ 
2016/08/04/the-challenges-of-intergovernmental-relations-in-insolvency/ (describing the loan 
agreement between Atlantic City and New Jersey as “one-sided” with a “scorched earth nature”). 
 6. Rizzo, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fund a bankruptcy and plan of adjustment. Atlantic City now finds itself 
between a rock and a hard place: unable to liquidate as a business could, but 
beyond the point where federal bankruptcy would be sensible, it has become 
dependent on reluctantly-given state aid and continues to struggle. 
The stories of Detroit and Atlantic City illustrate how difficult it can be 
to figure out when or whether8 to file for municipal bankruptcy. Indeed, 
these cities are just two of many municipalities that cannot easily determine 
whether a federal bankruptcy solution makes economic and political sense.9 
As David Skeel and Clayton Gillette have observed, politics and concerns 
about stigma play a role in determining whether a municipality will file for 
bankruptcy or not.10 But on the legal front, a municipality’s entry into the 
federal bankruptcy system is further complicated by chapter 9’s eligibility 
requirements, which incorporate a dizzying array of hurdles a municipality 
must clear before obtaining federal relief. The expense, time, and legal 
effort necessary for an eligibility determination may ultimately discourage 
cities from taking advantage of the bankruptcy process. This Article argues 
that the chapter 9 eligibility rules unnecessarily impede access to municipal 
bankruptcy, a process that already has sufficient safeguards against 
opportunistic or careless filings. The front-end gatekeeping provided by the 
eligibility requirements is also aberrational within the bankruptcy system: 
no other type of debtor is subjected to such a rigorous, litigious screening 
process11 before bankruptcy relief is granted.12 
 
 
 8. As will be discussed below, the question of when to file for bankruptcy is often inextricably 
linked to the question of whether a municipality should file. Nevertheless, this Article articulates two 
distinct problems: (1) how timing affects a municipality’s ability to seek maximum relief; and (2) how 
the eligibility rules fail to filter would-be debtors in a way that recognizes those debtors that would 
receive optimal relief in bankruptcy. 
 9. Other municipalities include, for example, Chicago and North Las Vegas. See, e.g., Ted 
Dabrowski, Chicago Slides Toward Bankruptcy, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (May 15, 2015, 4:12 
PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ted-dabrowski/chicago-slides-toward-ban_b_7287366.html; 
James Nash, North Las Vegas Risks Insolvency Like Detroit, Fitch Says, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 5, 
2014, 7:34 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-06/north-las-vegas-risks-insolvency-
like-detroit-fitch-says. 
 10. Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1183 (“The stigma of a bankruptcy filing also has a chilling 
effect, especially for large and complex municipalities.”). 
 11. The means test is another screening process used to determine debtor eligibility for chapter 7 
bankruptcy. Although cumbersome and expensive, recent research concludes that it is not that difficult 
to pass. In addition, U.S. Trustee motions to dismiss or convert chapter 7 cases for debtors who do not 
pass the means test have fallen by more than half since 2010. Ed Flynn, Inside the Black Box: The Means 
Test at 10, 35-APR Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 46 (2016). 
 12. For example, to commence a chapter 11 case an entity generally needs only to file a petition 
and accompanying schedules with the bankruptcy court. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, Chapter 
11 – Bankruptcy Basics, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/ 
chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (noting that upon filing a petition for chapter 11 relief, the entity in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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Although municipal bankruptcy is rare, municipal distress is not.13 As 
increasing numbers of cities and towns face fiscal distress, many will 
consider chapter 9 as an option for resolving their problems.14 It is therefore 
crucial to determine with precision what cities stand to gain from a 
municipal bankruptcy filing. This Article will illustrate that the current 
eligibility rules stand in the way of this determination and discourage 
municipalities from seeking relief until long after a municipality has begun 
to experience severe distress. By the time a municipality files for chapter 9, 
therefore, it may not be in the best position to take full advantage of all that 
bankruptcy has to offer.15 
Although the chapter 9 bankruptcies filed over the past few years have 
renewed scholarly interest in municipal bankruptcy,16 the academic 
literature to date has only briefly and sporadically touched on chapter 9 
eligibility.17 A holistic reform of the eligibility requirements is needed 
 
 
question automatically becomes a “debtor in possession” that can reorganize in bankruptcy). 
 13. See generally Wolf Richter, Fed’s Dudley Warns About Wave of Municipal Bankruptcies, 
WOLF STREET (Apr. 14, 2015), http://wolfstreet.com/2015/04/14/feds-dudley-warns-on-municipal-
bonds-bankruptcies-defaults/ (describing “emerging fiscal stresses” in the municipal sector and noting 
that bond ratings do not necessarily reflect the widespread problems municipalities are facing). 
 14. See, e.g., Sean Whaley, NLV Mayor Backs Bankruptcy Power for Cities, Counties, L.V. REV. 
J. (Apr. 4, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-legislature/nlv-mayor-backs-
bankruptcy-power-cities-counties (describing a bill pending in the Nevada legislature to allow the state’s 
cities and counties to file for chapter 9). 
 15. For example, filing for bankruptcy may facilitate a municipality’s ability to impose a tax 
increase on otherwise unconsenting parties. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
2013) (“Putting the fiscal house in order so that voters might be willing to entertain tax increases is the 
whole point of chapter 9.”). 
 16. For example, several scholars have considered reforms for the chapter 9 confirmation 
requirements. See infra Part III.A.2. Attention to confirmation, however, is only half of the solution, as 
municipalities need access to bankruptcy before they can even begin to consider the confirmation 
requirements. 
 17. See Christopher Smith, Comment, Provisions for Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy: Their Flaws 
and the Inadequacy of Past Reforms, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 497 (1998) (suggesting that Congress clarify 
the requirements for state authorization and refine the definition of “municipality”); Daniel J. Freyberg, 
Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current 
State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency—And What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001 
(1997) (arguing that states should enact statutes regarding the resolution of municipal fiscal distress); 
Nicholas B. Malito, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview of Chapter 9 and a Critique of the “Specifically 
Authorized” and “Insolvent” Eligibility Requirements of 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 17 NORTON J. BANKR. 
L. & PRAC. 517 (2008) (arguing that the state authorization requirement should revert back to general 
authorization and that the insolvency requirement be amended to allow municipalities to file once they 
reach the “zone of insolvency”); Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Problem with Chapter 9 
Eligibility—A Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988), 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625 (1990) (proposing 
an amendment to the state authorization requirement); Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming 
California Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885 (2002) (focusing on California’s 
authorization provision); M. Heith Frost, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, 
Specific Authorization, and Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 Miss. L.J. 817 (2015) (arguing 
that states should implement a combination of express and conditional authorization for chapter 9); 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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because a municipality will not be able to reap the benefits of chapter 9 
without first being deemed eligible for relief. As this Article will illustrate, 
the eligibility requirements are largely unnecessary, as chapter 9 has so 
many negative consequences and built-in costs that only cities in desperate 
financial shape will use it. Furthermore, the standards for confirming a plan 
of adjustment in chapter 9 provide substantial safeguards that are often 
replicated by the eligibility rules, forcing municipalities that engage in the 
chapter 9 process to fight duplicative battles at the eligibility and 
confirmation stages and further increasing the costs of an already expensive 
process. 
Critics argue that, since chapter 9 is not used very often compared to the 
other bankruptcy chapters, it is not very useful.18 Yet, this Article will show 
that chapter 9 is not being used because it is so difficult to access in its 
current formulation. Changing the eligibility rules may help a municipality 
prevent a truly dire situation, transforming chapter 9 from a last resort into 
a valuable tool in a municipality’s arsenal. By focusing on increasing 
chapter 9’s utility, this Article’s proposals also provide guidance to courts 
and legislatures considering the question of which municipalities should 
have access to chapter 9 bankruptcy tools. 
This Article thus makes two distinct contributions to the existing 
literature. First, the Article ties bankruptcy theory together with municipal 
finance research that pinpoints common sources of municipal fiscal distress 
in order to identify when and why a municipality might choose to file for 
chapter 9. Second, the Article proposes a set of revisions to the eligibility 
rules designed to facilitate, rather than impede, access to chapter 9. In doing 
so, this Article demonstrates the shortcomings of the eligibility rules as 
currently constituted. 
Importantly, this Article focuses only on general-purpose municipalities: 
cities, towns, and counties. Special-purpose entities, which may also be 
 
 
Michael J. Deitch, Note, Time for an Update: A New Framework for Evaluating Chapter 9 Bankruptcies, 
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705 (2015) (proposing a multipart test for analyzing whether a municipality meets 
the statutory conditions required for chapter 9); Tom D. Hoffmann, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy 
Authorization Under Chapter 9: A Call for Uniformity Among States, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 215 
(2014) (arguing that all states should uniformly authorize unfettered access to chapter 9 bankruptcy for 
their municipalities in order to promote uniformity and predictability). 
 18. See, e.g., Katherine Newby Kishfy, Comment, Preserving Local Autonomy in the Face of 
Municipal Financial Crisis: Reconciling Rhode Island’s Response to the Central Falls Financial Crisis 
with the State’s Home Rule Tradition, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 348, 358 (2011) (“Overall . . . 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy provides an incomplete solution to the problem of municipal insolvency.”); Omer 
Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351 
(2010); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 864 (2012) (“[T]he solution to 
state and local fiscal crises is largely a matter of politics . . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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eligible to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy, face eligibility hurdles as well, but 
these hurdles are of a different nature. Although many of the proposed 
changes to the eligibility rules may be applied to special-purpose entities, 
these entities merit their own consideration and, possibly, their own entry 
rules.19  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I serves as the foundation for the 
rest of the Article, introducing the literature on municipal fiscal distress and 
pinpointing common triggers. Part II connects this foundation with 
bankruptcy history and theory to determine why a federal bankruptcy 
solution exists for municipalities. Part III explains how the current 
eligibility rules discourage many municipalities from seeking federal relief. 
Part IV then proposes specific reforms for the chapter 9 eligibility process. 
Using the groundwork laid in the previous parts, Part IV suggests sweeping 
changes to the eligibility rules to facilitate access to chapter 9. Part IV also 
addresses concerns regarding the proposed changes, emphasizing that 
significant safeguards remain to prevent opportunistic or bad faith filings. 
Part V briefly concludes by emphasizing how these changes will enable 
distressed municipalities to take full advantage of the federal bankruptcy 
toolkit and by raising a connection to the broader issue of access to 
bankruptcy. 
I. CAUSES OF MUNICIPAL DISTRESS  
Although the causes of municipal distress have been extensively studied, 
it remains difficult to determine when a municipality’s entry into 
bankruptcy would make sense. This Part begins to fill this gap by using the 
existing literature to identify and categorize sources of distress. A better 
understanding of the underlying sources of municipal distress drives the 
creation of the rules, discussed in Part IV, that determine when a 
municipality should be eligible for bankruptcy. 
Definitively ascertaining the sources of municipal fiscal distress is not 
an easy task, as distress varies depending on factors such as the type of 
municipal entity, the nature and variety of the municipality’s creditors, and 
the overall state of the economy.20 Variation in municipalities across the 
country necessarily means that some creditors may be more lenient than 
others, or some municipalities may have more access to debt financing than 
 
 
 19. See Laura Napoli Coordes, Restructuring Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 307, 
348–49 (advocating for separate rules and procedures for special-purpose entities in chapter 9). 
 20. See generally Samir D. Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 221, 230 – 37 (2015). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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others. Nevertheless, common themes exist and can provide valuable insight 
into some of the main causes of fiscal crises.21 
A. Overview: Cyclical v. Structural Distress 
There are arguably many ways to categorize the types of distress 
municipalities face; however, a prominent distinction is that between 
distress that is cyclical, or rises and falls over time, and distress that is 
structural in nature, resulting from long-term deficit imbalances.22 These 
two types of distress frequently form the basis for categorizing more 
specific situations.  
Because cyclical distress fluctuates naturally as part of the business 
cycle, a focus on the category of structural imbalance is particularly 
valuable, both because it is easier to control the causes of structural distress 
than it is to exert control over the overall boom-and-bust nature of the 
national economy and because structural imbalances can make it more 
difficult to resolve cyclical problems.23 A municipality’s fiscal structure, 
economic and demographic trends within the municipality, and the 
decisions of the municipality’s political leaders all contribute to structural 
imbalance.24 For example, during good times, a municipality’s governing 
body might decide to permanently reduce tax rates but keep expenditures 
constant.25 When the economy weakens over time, this structural imbalance 
is exposed and may cause the municipality more difficulty than if the 
governing body had decided to hold tax rates constant. Thus, cyclical and 
structural distress are related: cyclical fluctuations complicate problems 
with structural imbalances, and vice versa.  
The cyclical-structural lens thus helps demonstrate that although distress 
can be caused by factors outside of a municipality’s control,26 municipalities 
may nevertheless be able to prevent or minimize the effects of such cyclical 
 
 
 21. See, e.g., Jessica L. Sandham, NEA: Fiscal Troubles Ahead for Many States, EDUCATION 
WEEK (Nov. 25, 1998), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1998/11/25/13nc.h18.html (discussing a 
report from the National Education Association describing fiscal troubles in several states). 
 22. MATTHEW MURRAY ET AL., BROOKINGS MOUNTAIN W. & MORRISON INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, 
STRUCTURALLY UNBALANCED: CYCLICAL AND STRUCTURAL DEFICITS IN CALIFORNIA AND THE 
INTERMOUNTAIN WEST 7 (2011). http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/ 2011/1/05-
state-budgets/0105_state_budgets.pdf. 
 23. Id. at 4. 
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. Id. at 8 (describing California, which, through Proposition 13, has amended its constitution to 
limit local property tax revenue growth). Political structures may also influence this decision, as it is 
often much easier to lower taxes (rather than raise them) in many states. 
 26. See generally Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 
88 B.U. L. REV. 633 (2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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crises when they arise by controlling sources of structural imbalance. With 
this overview in mind, the next subsections will examine prevailing theories 
of the causes of structural distress. 
B. Management Problems: Source or Scapegoat? 
Scholars often point to political leadership or “management” problems 
as a source of structural imbalance. These problems typically take two 
forms: those related to the structure of the municipality’s government, and 
those related to the decisions emanating from that government. 
Management-related problems can include high turnover in city 
government, diverging interests between municipal officials and their 
constituents, and a fragmented decision-making structure.27 These problems 
are related: for example, municipal officials whose terms are about to expire 
may take a very different view of the long-term costs and benefits of current 
expenditures than city residents.28 These officials may show a tendency to 
“kick the can down the road,” leaving it up to incoming officials to ensure 
adequate funding for these expenditures. For their part, city residents may 
feel very differently about whether and how to fund a particular project, as 
they will be more likely than an outgoing official to bear the costs (or reap 
the benefits) of present expenditures.  
Fragmented decision-making structures can heighten the tendency to 
make rash decisions about expenditures. Clayton Gillette explains 
fragmented decision-making as a budgetary system where “there are 
multiple points of access and review before a decision is finalized.”29 As a 
result, “those who seek government funds may find success through a 
variety of avenues, and none of the gatekeepers on those avenues has reason 
to be concerned about the budget as a whole.”30 Decision-makers may 
therefore commit to making expenditures without considering the effects of 
their decisions on other municipal agencies.31  
The consequences of overly optimistic decision-making have become 
 
 
 27. See Clayton P. Gillette, Can Municipal Political Structure Improve Fiscal Performance?, 33 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 571, 572 (2014). Fiscal mismanagement and the influence of special interests 
can also create management problems. See, e.g., Caitlin McGlade, Glendale Audit Fallout: 4 Officials 
on Leave, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:29 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/community/ 
glendale/articles/20130824audit-fallout-officials-leave-prog.html (describing an illegal effort in 
Glendale, Arizona to hide fiscal activities from the city council and suspiciously high salaries paid to 
city administrators). 
 28. Gillette, supra note 27, at 572. 
 29. Id. at 576. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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strikingly clear in recent years. As a recent example of how decisions made 
in better times can hurt a municipality later, consider San Bernardino, 
California, which long ago decided to link its public-safety personnel’s 
compensation to that of workers in similarly-sized communities.32 Over 
time, these communities have flourished while San Bernardino has 
struggled. Yet, public safety workers in San Bernardino are still paid the 
same as workers in these wealthier communities, and San Bernardino, 
which is now in bankruptcy, has been largely unsuccessful in making up the 
difference.33 Detroit is a further example of a city faced with the 
consequences of overly optimistic thinking: a boom town in the early part 
of the 20th century, Detroit saw its population shrink in later years as the 
automotive industry, which the city relied on for jobs, closed factories and 
relocated them to other cities.34  
Problems with employee compensation, pensions, and other 
postemployment benefits could also make up their own category. Since the 
turn of the century, cities have experienced rapid increases in the costs of 
promised employee benefits, which, along with salaries and health benefits, 
typically make up the largest portion of city budgets and debts.35 In addition 
to San Bernardino, many cities and towns, including Prichard, Alabama; 
Central Falls, Rhode Island; and Vallejo, California have struggled to pay 
these benefits in and outside of bankruptcy.36 
Given constraints on city decision-making, some scholars suggest 
categorizing municipal distress according to what local management can 
and cannot control. For example, Omer Kimhi has divided fiscal distress 
sources into two categories: socioeconomic processes outside of the city and 
local management problems.37 In the first category, Kimhi includes factors 
such as the national business cycle, suburbanization, and state and federal 
 
 
 32. See Frank Shafroth, Puerto Rico & Greece: A Disparity, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT (July 6, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/07/06/puerto-rico-greece-a-
disparity/; see also STEPHEN D. EIDE, MANHATTAN INST., DEFEATING FISCAL DISTRESS: A STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2013), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_78.pdf (referring to “gross 
mismanagement by Detroit officials”).  
 33. One could argue that San Bernardino could overcome this problem by reducing employees. 
Yet, the city needs to retain a minimum number of employees to provide basic city services, something 
it cannot do if it is to retain their compensation levels.  
 34. Micki Maynard, How Detroit Went from Boom Town to Bust, JALOPNIK (Mar. 23, 2011, 4:00 
PM), http://jalopnik.com/5784999/how-detroit-went-from-boom-town-to-bust. 
 35. See Eide, supra note 32, at 2. 
 36. Cate Long, The Real History of Public Pensions in Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2013/08/08/the-real-history-of-public-pensions-in-bankruptcy/.  
 37. Omer Kimhi, A Tale of Four Cities—Models of State Intervention in Distressed Localities 
Fiscal Affairs, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 881, 905–06 (2012). 
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policies that affect municipalities.38 In the second category, he lists factors 
like city size and procedural fragmentation.39 Like cyclical and structural 
sources, these categories easily intersect: to take a few examples, 
suburbanization has a direct impact on city size, and changes in state and 
federal policy can directly affect the way a municipality makes decisions, 
as when a state puts a municipality under a state oversight board. 
C. Individual Poverty: Cause or Consequence? 
There is no doubt that problems with a city’s management and problems 
with its residents can be linked. But some scholars have argued that 
management problems are too often used as a “scapegoat” for insolvency 
that is actually caused by more “systemic challenges,” such as poverty and 
population loss.40 Although it is difficult to disentangle the numerous factors 
at play in municipal financial failure, individual poverty almost certainly 
plays a role. 
Michelle Anderson has observed that most struggling cities, such as 
Prichard, Alabama and Central Falls, Rhode Island, have high amounts of 
individual poverty.41 This poverty can subject the municipality to a 
downward spiral: residents who can no longer afford to own homes create 
housing vacancies, which in turn drag down land markets; this drag 
decreases property tax revenues, which are chiefly used to maintain public 
safety and enrich the lives of the municipality’s residents.42 Therefore, 
Anderson points out, as city residents become poorer, the city itself can 
move deeper into insolvency.43 When a city takes the probable next step of 
selling assets to raise revenue, it roots itself even further into insolvency, as 
those assets are no longer available to the municipality for long-term 
revenue generation.44 
As a way to break this cycle, one might suggest that the municipality 
raise taxes rather than sell assets or cut services. But raising taxes may not 
be feasible—even in cities where residents and officials are amenable to a 
tax increase, approval for an increase may need to be sought at the state 
 
 
 38. Id. at 906. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1216 (2014) 
(“[M]ismanagement can be a scapegoat explanation for insolvency that distracts from other systemic 
challenges.”). 
 41. Id. at 1136 (describing the median poverty rate for twenty-eight struggling cities as more than 
double the national poverty rate). 
 42. Id. at 1138–39. 
 43. Id. at 1139. 
 44. Id. at 1167–68. 
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level, where a new layer of officials must be convinced of the efficacy and 
urgency of the increase.45 Furthermore, tax increases, or the threat of them, 
can scare away mobile sources of capital, including employers.46 Thus, it is 
often extremely difficult for municipalities to increase the revenue available 
to meet their expenditures without suffering collateral damage.47 The 
difficulties associated with even the threat of a tax increase suggest that 
cities may prefer to reduce debt burdens before they are forced to raise taxes 
and potentially trigger a cycle of departures. 
In short, the economic status of a municipality’s population can directly 
affect the fiscal health of the municipality itself. Because municipalities 
typically rely on property tax revenue to meet expenditures, municipal fiscal 
distress is “directly related to the loss of household wealth and income 
caused by sharp declines in home values, increased foreclosures, and 
widespread job loss,” all of which are exacerbated during cyclical 
downturns.48 
D. Federal and State Effects 
Just as the fiscal health of a city’s residents may impact the 
municipality’s fiscal strength, so too does the health of the municipality’s 
state create effects that resonate at the municipal level. If a state government 
is facing its own fiscal pressures, some of this pressure will likely be passed 
down to the state’s municipalities in the form of declining state aid, which 
in turn can force a city to reduce its own public services.49 State pressures, 
in turn, can be exacerbated by changes at the federal level. 
Some examples of federal and state effects include changes in federal 
 
 
 45. See Karol K. Denniston, Neutral Evaluation in Chapter 9 Bankruptcies: Mitigating Municipal 
Distress, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 261, 263 (2012) (“Raising taxes is difficult, and in many instances 
impossible [for municipalities]….”); see also Frank Shafroth, Human & Fiscal Disruption in Municipal 
Bankruptcy, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://fiscal 
bankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/12/22/human-fiscal-disruption-in-municipal-bankruptcy/ (describing 
how Jefferson County, Alabama, tried to raise taxes prior to filing for bankruptcy but failed when a court 
struck down the tax because state legislators had failed to advertise it properly). 
 46. See, e.g., Frank Shafroth, Human & Fiscal Disruption & Mayhem and the Importance of 
Municipal Bankruptcy, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Dec. 10, 2015), https://fiscal 
bankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/12/10/human-fiscal-disruption-mayhem-and-the-importance-of-
municipal-bankruptcy/ (noting that both Detroit and Puerto Rico have experienced an exodus of families 
that can afford to leave in conjunction with the cities’ fiscal crises). 
 47. Denniston, supra note 45, at 263 (noting that “few cities have significant assets that can be 
easily sold”). 
 48. John C. Philo, Local Government Fiscal Emergencies and the Disenfranchisement of Victims 
of the Global Recession, 13 J. L. SOC’Y 71, 72 (2011).  
 49. Id. at 78. 
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and state mandates, revenue cuts, and state limitations on tax levies.50 
Gerald Frug and David Barron have described how state law impacts almost 
every aspect of municipal budgets.51 State law typically dictates the 
essential services municipalities must provide to residents, thereby directly 
shaping city expenditures.52 At the same time, states can also restrict how 
local revenues are generated by, for example, limiting or prohibiting city 
income taxes.53 Thus, cities often find themselves at the mercy of the state 
when it comes to how much revenue they can generate and how much 
freedom they have to direct expenditures towards various projects.54 
Because of state controls over city services and revenue sources, cities 
facing declining revenues often only have one avenue through which they 
can make cuts: shrinking the workforce.55  
Special legislation at the state level can further constrain a city. For 
example, states often prohibit cities from spending money for specific 
purposes, require cities to pay for state-level services, and mandate city 
funding of state-created governmental authorities.56 Some cities, like New 
York City, are under strict state fiscal oversight.57 In short, city governments 
do not operate in a vacuum. Instead, they are subject to controls and 
restrictions from the federal and state governments.58 Thus, when distress 
occurs at the federal and state level, it will have an undeniable impact on 
the municipal level as well.59 
 
 
 50. See generally Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 647 
(2014) (discussing the connection between city and state boundary law). 
 51. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 45, at 75–98. 
 52. Id. at 92 (“[T]he degree of city flexibility is a product of state statutes and court decisions.”). 
 53. See id. at 85–86. 
 54. See id. at 77–78 (noting that the city of Boston is a particularly salient example of this 
situation). 
 55. Id. at 92–93 (noting that Seattle spends about 80% of its budget on core services, including 
utilities, and that Denver and Chicago spend between 70–80% of their general fund revenues on 
personnel costs).  
 56. See id. at 95–98. 
 57. Id. at 93–94 (noting that New York City is under the oversight of the state-created Municipal 
Assistance Corporation). 
 58. See Frank Shafroth, “Our City Would Become Unlivable,” GMU MUNICIPAL SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/09/24/our-city-would-become-
unlivable/ (“Many of Chicago’s fiscal problems are embedded in state law.”). 
 59. See Tyson, supra note 50 at 695 (discussing Michigan’s municipal incorporation and 
annexation policies and how they have contributed to Detroit’s fiscal distress); see also Sheila A. Martin 
& Carolyn N. Long, Horizontal Intergovernmental Relations in the Portland Metropolitan Region, 50 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 589, 608 (2014) (noting that “federal money to state and local governments is 
declining”). 
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E. Failed Projects or Events 
Structural distress can also occur from a one-time misfortune rather than 
a struggle that develops over the long term.60 These events may be 
anticipated by officials, although the extent of their impact may be 
unpredictable. For example, a city may invest in the construction of a 
stadium on municipal property, with the hope that the stadium will attract 
residents and visitors to the municipality and generate revenue. If the 
stadium fails to generate the revenue anticipated, it may cause problems if 
the municipality has made expenditures that are dependent on revenue flow 
from the stadium.61 
A vivid example of a bankruptcy due to failed projections is that of 
Orange County, California. Orange County filed for bankruptcy after heavy 
borrowing and risky investments in its investment pool turned sour.62 The 
Orange County fund had counted on interest rates staying low or declining, 
and when rates began to rise, the county found itself in distress.63 
Alternatively, relatively unexpected one-time events, as when an 
individual or company successfully brings suit against the city for a tort or 
contract problem, may also contribute to municipal distress.64 Recently, 
Hillview, Kentucky filed for bankruptcy after failing to settle a claim for 
$11.4 million that stemmed from a breach of contract case.65 The money 
owed to the judgment creditor added interest at a rate of 12% annually and 
was not covered by the city’s insurance.66 Similarly, the town of Mammoth 
Lakes, California filed for bankruptcy after being saddled with a judgment 
for $43 million related to a development lawsuit.67 Mammoth Lakes was 
 
 
 60. Deitch, supra note 17, at 2717–18. 
 61. See, e.g., Rebekah L. Sanders, Foreclosures Expected to Put Glendale Westgate City Center 
on New Track, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2011, 9:02 AM) http://archive.azcentral.com/news/ 
articles/2011/10/26/20111026glendale-westgate-foreclosures-new-track.html (describing a failing 
project in Glendale, Arizona and noting that the project is “vital to Glendale’s financial future”). 
 62. Floyd Norris, Orange County’s Bankruptcy: The Overview; Orange County Crisis Jolts Bond 
Market, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/08/business/orange-county-s-
bankruptcy-the-overview-orange-county-crisis-jolts-bond-market.html. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (noting the threat of lawsuits over risky investments made by Orange County’s investment 
fund); see also Michael Galen, Note, Chapter 9 Bankruptcy in California: The Efficacy of Mandating 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Municipal Bankruptcy Filings, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547, 
559 (2014) (describing the Mammoth Lakes bankruptcy, where the town owed over $42 million to a 
single creditor). 
 65. Marcus Green, City of Hillview in Bullitt County Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WDRB.COM 
(Aug. 21, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.wdrb.com/story/29845100/city-of-hillview-in-bullitt-county-
files-for-bankruptcy-protection. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Laura Mahoney, Judge Dismisses Town of Mammoth Lakes Bankruptcy Case Following 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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able to settle its lawsuit after filing for bankruptcy and so dismissed its 
bankruptcy case.68 
Cataloguing the myriad causes of municipal fiscal distress makes it 
possible to see that neither bankruptcy nor any other mechanism, standing 
alone, will resolve all of these diverse causes.69 Rather, bankruptcy is one 
of a number of ways to resolve specific types of distress. The next Part will 
explore the specific role chapter 9 bankruptcy is designed to play in 
alleviating particular sources of municipal distress. 
II. BANKRUPTCY SOLUTIONS 
This Part analyzes bankruptcy history and theory to determine the core 
functions of a federal bankruptcy solution to some of the problems 
identified in Part I. It discusses the main role chapter 9 has come to serve 
and distinguishes that role from alternatives, such as state action.  
Determining the goals of municipal bankruptcy is a difficult task, 
complicated by the fact that municipal distress looks very different than that 
facing an individual or corporation. Nevertheless, a review of the history 
and literature surrounding chapter 9 reveals several core functions.  
A. Bankruptcy Purposes and History 
The current iteration of municipal bankruptcy laws has been shaped by 
years of history. Congress enacted the predecessor to modern-day chapter 9 
in response to the Great Depression, when thousands of municipalities 
defaulted on their obligations.70 The provisions were meant to be temporary 
and to serve as an emergency source of federal relief for municipalities 
facing writs of mandamus from bondholders.71 Nevertheless, Congress 
continued to extend the operative date of the provisions and eventually, they 
became a permanent part of what is now the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
 
Settlement, BNA BANKR. L. REP., Nov. 29, 2012, 24 BKY 1546.  
 68. Id. 
 69. See generally Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Cases, in 
CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING 
PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 173 (Aspatore 
2011), 2011 WL 5053640. 
 70. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL 
EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 10 tbl. 2-1 (1973) (noting that from 1930–1939, 
government units defaulted approximately 4700 times). 
 71. See Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798, 798 (“There is hereby found, 
determined, and declared to exist a national emergency caused by increasing financial difficulties of 
many local governmental units, which renders imperative the further exercise of the bankruptcy powers 
of the Congress of the United States.”). 
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In 1936, the Supreme Court held that the first iteration of the municipal 
bankruptcy legislation was unconstitutional because it infringed on the 
states’ sovereign powers.72 In response, Congress enacted new legislation 
that explicitly required no federal interference with municipalities’ fiscal or 
political affairs, no involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, and no state 
impairment of contractual obligations.73 The Supreme Court upheld the new 
legislation in 1938, noting the distinct roles it had delineated for the federal 
and state governments and observing that the new legislation had been 
carefully drawn not to impinge on state sovereignty.74 
Early cases on these bankruptcy laws thus make clear that the role of the 
bankruptcy court was intended to be limited. The court’s singular function 
was to approve or disapprove a proposed plan of reorganization of a 
municipality’s debt.75 The court had no ability to direct the flow of a 
municipality’s money and no jurisdiction to set or settle boundary 
disputes.76 Thus, as Clayton Gillette and David Skeel observe, chapter 9 
essentially served one function: “preventing holdout[] [creditors] from 
scuttling a restructuring that most creditors had approved.”77  
This core function can be broken down further into two component parts. 
The first is nonconsensual debt adjustment: bankruptcy allows 
municipalities to rewrite their debt agreements, even if parties disagree with 
the changes.78 To achieve this result, bankruptcy enables the municipality 
to prevent holdout creditors from blocking a restructuring by providing tools 
to overcome the resistance of a minority of creditors.79 The second 
 
 
 72. Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, reh’g denied, 299 
U.S. 619 (1936). 
 73. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 654. 
 74. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, reh’g denied, 304 U.S. 589 (1938). 
 75. See Leco Props. Inc. v. R.E. Crummer & Co., 128 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1942). 
 76. Green v. City of Stuart, 135 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1943). 
 77. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1171; see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and 
Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 64 (2016) (“[B]ankruptcy’s role is to impair 
claims over the objection of holdout creditors.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 40, at 1154 (contrasting with state law programs); David N. 
Crapo, New Jersey Municipalities, Chapter 9, and Creditors’ Rights, BUS. ADVISOR (Apr. 22, 2015), at 
2, http://www.gibbonslaw.com/Resources/Listing.aspx (search in search bar for “New Jersey 
Municipalities”) (noting that the “traditional goal in municipal bankruptcies” was restructuring bond 
debt, but the new goal is reducing “both bond and retiree-related debt”); Malito, supra note 17 
(”[M]unicipalities with…problems rooted in labor spending and health-benefit obligations may also 
seek refuge in Chapter 9 in order to restructure these agreements.”); Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water 
Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 530, reh’g denied, 299 U.S. 619 (1936) (“The especial 
purpose of all bankruptcy legislation is to interfere with the relations between the parties concerned—to 
change, modify, or impair the obligation of their contracts.”). 
 79. Eide, supra note 32, at 5; see also Judith Greenstone Miller, Amendment to Provide Good Faith 
Filing Requirement for Chapter 11 Debtors, 102 COM. L.J. 181, 181 (1997) (noting that bankruptcy is 
meant to be a collective proceeding); Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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component relates to breathing space: chapter 9 temporarily protects a 
municipal debtor from creditor collection actions, thereby enabling that 
debtor to establish a repayment plan.80 Indeed, the imposition of the 
automatic stay in bankruptcy is a powerful tool for holding pushy creditors 
at bay: once a bankruptcy case is filed and the automatic stay is in place, 
creditors can no longer enforce their prepetition claims against the debtor, 
nor demand any payments for those claims. The imposition of the automatic 
stay gives the municipality the breathing space it needs to design and submit 
a plan of adjustment for its debts,81 and the municipality’s exclusive right to 
submit such a plan while in bankruptcy further protects it from creditor 
interference.  
These functions are not unique to chapter 9; they are also frequently cited 
as justifications for the bankruptcy system in general. For example, contract 
impairment, including the impairment of pension obligations, is one of the 
main functions of federal bankruptcy law,82 because although a state 
remains in control of its municipality, it may not bind non-consenting 
creditors to a debt adjustment procedure if that procedure would violate the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution.83  
 
 
Bankruptcy, 71 WASH & LEE L. REV. 403, 447 (2014) (“Congress had a modest goal, that of solving the 
holdout problem, in passing the [chapter 9] legislation.”); Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, 
and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 20 (2014) (“Chapter IX was 
originally devised for the narrow purpose of giving municipalities a tool to solve the dissenting creditor 
holdout problem.”); Ashton, 298 U.S. at 541 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“Experience makes it certain that 
generally there will be at least a small minority of creditors who will resist a composition, however fair 
and reasonable, if the law does not subject them to a pressure to obey the general will. This is the impasse 
from which the [bankruptcy] statute gives relief.”). 
 80. See Deitch, supra note 17, at 2724; Malito, supra note 17 (noting that this “breathing spell” is 
intended to allow the municipality to continue to provide public services to residents); see also Frank 
Shafroth, Juggling Creditors, Public Safety, & Democracy in the Midst of Municipal Bankruptcy, GMU 
MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Dec. 24, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress. 
com/2015/12/24/juggling-creditors-public-safety-democracy-in-the-midst-of-municipal-bankruptcy/ 
(questioning whether legislation proposed to temporarily halt litigation over Puerto Rico’s debt is 
constitutional in the absence of bankruptcy access). 
 81. Frank Shafroth, How Does One Define “Essential Public Services” for a Municipality in 
Distress, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (July 31, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress. 
com/2015/07/31/how-does-one-define-essential-public-services-for-a-municipality-in-distress/ 
(“Perhaps the single most critical value of municipal bankruptcy is the immediate protection of a city or 
county’s ability to ensure the provision of essential public services while its [sic] sorts out its debts under 
the ever watchful scrutiny of a federal bankruptcy judge . . . .”). 
 82. J. Robert Stoll et al., Detroit Eligible to File Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, MAYER BROWN LEGAL 
UPDATE (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.mayerbrown.com/Detroit-Eligible-to-File-Chapter-9-
Bankruptcy-Winter-2014/ (follow “Get the full report” link) (noting that Judge Rhodes’ opinion in the 
Detroit bankruptcy singled out contract impairment as “one of the primary purposes” for bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
 83. 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 903.03[2]; Vazquez, supra note 69, at *3; 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012). 
Recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the conclusion that states cannot devise their own debt 
composition solutions for municipalities in Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 
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Notably, however, these purposes are limited, suggesting that chapter 9 
by itself was not intended to function as a source of holistic relief to 
municipalities struggling under all of the various forms of distress described 
in Part I.84 For example, bankruptcy by itself will not be able to alter the 
vast majority of state and federal structures described in Part I.D that 
influence municipal revenues and expenditures. If changes to federal and 
state law are necessary for a municipality’s rehabilitation, some other 
mechanism will be needed to implement those changes. This is not to say 
that chapter 9 cannot assist with accomplishing other goals;85 however, a 
municipality’s need for assistance with the main functions outlined above 
should be the focal point when considering a municipality’s eligibility for 
bankruptcy. 
Although chapter 9 is limited in scope, it is equally critical to recognize 
the importance of the role of the bankruptcy judge. As will be discussed in 
more detail below, the judge helps to ensure that chapter 9’s mechanisms 
are being utilized properly, particularly at the confirmation stage, where the 
judge is asked to confirm, or approve, the municipality’s plan for adjustment 
of its debts.  
Chapter 9’s history also reveals the impetus behind the eligibility 
requirements. Congress implemented strict eligibility rules for chapter 9 
primarily to ensure that municipalities turned to federal bankruptcy only as 
a last resort.86 Subsequent court decisions have reinforced this point: for 
example, in In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District,87 the 
New Hampshire bankruptcy court held that the filing of a chapter 9 petition 
was not in good faith because the decision to file was not “a final alternative 
chosen as a last resort,” but rather was made before the municipality had 
exhausted its state and local alternatives.88 The Sullivan decision illustrates 
 
 
1942 (2016). 
 84. See generally Moringiello, supra note 79 (suggesting that chapter 9 was designed for 
cooperation between the states and the federal government). Watkins also argues that chapter 9 can 
effectuate critical structural and political reforms; however, these reforms can arguably be implemented 
at the state level and are therefore not unique to municipal bankruptcy. See Elizabeth M. Watkins, Note, 
In Defense of the Chapter 9 Option: Exploring the Promise of a Municipal Bankruptcy as a Mechanism 
for Structural Political Reform, 39 J. LEGIS. 89, 91 (2012–13).  
 85. For example, the debt discharge a municipality receives in chapter 9 can allow the municipality 
access to resources it could not obtain outside of bankruptcy. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1210. 
 86. or a description of the current eligibility requirements, see Part III.A.1, infra; see also Vazquez, 
supra note 69, at *7; Lam, supra note 17, at 630–35; Patrick Collins, Note, HMO Eligibility for 
Bankruptcy: The Case for Federal Definitions of 109(B)(2) Entities, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 
428 (1994) (“Congress could not have intended, by enacting section 109(b)(2), to cede to the states the 
authority to determine which persons shall be allowed access to the federal bankruptcy courts.”). 
 87. 165 B.R. 60 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). 
 88. Id. at 82 (emphasis added). 
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that the driving force behind the eligibility requirements is the notion that 
bankruptcy relief is a tool of last resort. 
B. Distinct Roles for State and Federal Law 
The background on chapter 9’s history and purposes helps determine the 
question of what roles federal and state laws should play in resolving a 
municipality’s financial distress. As the judge who oversaw Detroit’s 
bankruptcy recently confirmed, chapter 9 exists so that states (and their 
municipalities) can use the federal courts to solve problems that they cannot 
themselves resolve.89 Specifically, chapter 9 strikes a careful balance: the 
requirement from the Constitution and Congress that bankruptcy law and 
the nonconsensual impairment of contracts must come at the federal level is 
reconciled in chapter 9 with the Tenth Amendment mandate that local 
government access to federal bankruptcy relief be determined by the 
states.90 This balance is struck through the chapter 9 eligibility 
requirements, and particularly through the requirement that states must 
authorize their municipalities to file for bankruptcy.91  
What follows from this balance is the idea that distinct spheres of state 
and federal power exist, upon which federal and state law, respectively, 
should not encroach.92 Proposals to modify chapter 9 are therefore carefully 
 
 
 89. Steven W. Rhodes, Keynote Address at the American Bankruptcy Institute 33rd Annual Spring 
Meeting (Apr. 18, 2015), http://cle.abi.org/product/keynote-luncheon-conversation-hon-steven-w-
rhodes.  
 90. See Smith supra note 17, at 499–500 (1998); Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement 
Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 531, reh’g denied, 299 U.S. 619 (1936) (“The Constitution was careful to 
provide that ‘No State shall . . . pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’”). In Faitoute Iron 
& Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 504, 516 (1942), the Supreme Court upheld a state 
law permitting the adjustment of municipal debt if the city and 85% of its creditors agreed. Congress 
subsequently overruled this decision via statute and expressly prohibited state municipal bankruptcy 
laws adjusting creditors’ debts without their consent. H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at 4 (1946); see also 
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 334–35 (1st Cir. 2015) (discussing the 
congressional response to Faitoute); In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 143–144 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2013) (describing how courts, except in Faitoute, have consistently interpreted the Contracts Clause to 
prohibit the states from enacting legislation providing for municipal bankruptcies and how Faitoute’s 
precedential value is limited after courts have consistently distinguished Faitoute on its facts); Puerto 
Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S.Ct. 1938, 1945 (2016) (recognizing that Congress sought “to 
override Faitoute” with § 903 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 91. See Daniel G. Egan, City of Harrisburg Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Dismissed, DLA PIPER 
RESTRUCTURING E-NEWSL. – GLOBAL INSIGHT (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/ 
insights/publications/2012/03/city-of-harrisburg-chapter-9-bankruptcy-dismissed/ (discussing the 
constitutional considerations behind the state authorization requirement in the context of Harrisburg’s 
bankruptcy dismissal). 
 92. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 900 (1998) (noting 
that when Congress forbade state and local governments from enacting their own bankruptcy codes, it 
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scrutinized to ensure that this balance is maintained.93 Although 
policymakers are often wary of federal assistance that infringes upon state 
functions, it is equally important to recognize that the state, in turn, ought 
not prohibit its municipalities from accessing the forms of relief that 
Congress has determined only federal law can provide.94  
Thus, although only states may exercise plenary authority over their 
municipalities, only the federal government can create bankruptcy law.95 It 
follows that struggling municipalities should have the option of receiving 
assistance from the federal courts when a bankruptcy solution is needed.96 
Despite the states’ significant authority over their municipalities, they 
should be discouraged from preventing the federal government from 
providing relief when municipalities face financial crises that require core 
bankruptcy solutions: nonconsensual contract adjustment, breathing space, 
and elimination of a holdout creditor problem.97 This is particularly true 
because states, despite their extensive power over municipalities, may 
simply not be in the best position to provide relief to these entities, due to 
politics, concerns over stigma, or state-level financial difficulties.98 
Chapter 9 is designed to be deferential to state law interests, while 
encouraging federal involvement when needed to adjust the relationship 
between an insolvent municipal debtor and its creditors.99 Importantly, 
 
 
did so “because state and local institutions should not meddle in what ought to be exclusively national 
concerns”). 
 93. See Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1001. 
 94. Although both state and federal relief may arguably be possible, Congress sought a uniform, 
federal process for bankruptcy relief. H.R. REP. NO. 79-2246, at 4 (1946). Some scholars have 
questioned whether Congress’s designation of chapter 9 as the sole mechanism for reorganization is 
compatible with the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy 
Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 553, 571 (2014). Yet, the Supreme Court has not overruled Congress on 
this issue, and recent decisions from other courts have held that states cannot perform certain debt 
adjustment functions, such as cutting pensions and other benefits. See, e.g., Tim Jones & Elizabeth 
Campbell, Emanuel Said to Plan Property-Tax Boost for Chicago Pensions, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 
3, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-03/emanuel-said-to-plan-property-tax-
increase-for-chicago-pensions (describing Illinois Supreme Court ruling that threw out Chicago’s 
pension overhaul on the grounds that the benefit cuts the city sought were illegal). 
 95. Malito, supra note 17 (“The federal government is the sole entity that can create a uniform 
system of bankruptcy laws, but only the states can exert plenary authority over their subdivisions.”).  
 96. Id.  
 97. See Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 81, 83 (2012) (noting that the federal government is also “protecting fundamental national 
economic and financial interests” when subnational entities encounter financial crises). 
 98. See generally Coordes, supra note 19, at 353–55 (describing the drawbacks of state 
intervention programs); see also infra Part III.C & Part III.D (discussing politics in the City of 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania’s case and the rhetoric that may discourage state officials from providing 
optimal relief). 
 99. Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2002) 
(describing how the Code simultaneously “embraces” federalism yet relies on state law). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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chapter 9 leaves ample room for a significant state role in resolving 
municipal fiscal distress; however, in order for chapter 9 to function 
effectively, states must be aware of the limitations, however minimal, of 
their role. 
1. State Roles 
The state’s function in addressing municipal distress can take many 
forms. Perhaps the strongest form is a state bailout, where the state provides 
direct financial assistance to the city or town.100 The state may also appoint 
an emergency manager; in some cases, this manager is even empowered to 
assume all of the power and authority of local elected officials.101 These two 
forms of relief can thus be quite extreme; a more measured, and often more 
popular form of state relief, is the creation of state oversight boards. These 
boards do not replace elected officials, but they may still exercise significant 
authority over the financial affairs of a city or town.102 
Scholars often advocate state boards as a promising source of aid for a 
struggling municipality, as boards can perform many valuable functions, 
including gathering information, obtaining money for the city, and even 
approving a consensual financial rehabilitation plan.103 State boards may 
also exert pressure on local officials who are hesitant to implement 
measures like a tax increase, even going so far as to sanction cities that fail 
to follow their recommendations.104 State boards are also considered 
valuable because they can centralize fragmented decision-making 
processes, a key cause of municipal distress.105 Given these advantages, 
scholars have argued for an increased state role in resolving municipal fiscal 
distress rather than a role for federal bankruptcy.106 These scholars point out 
that the state, by virtue of its control over the municipality, is often in a good 
position to ascertain and address the underlying causes of municipal 
distress.107  
There is no doubt that the state is an important player in the battle against 
municipal distress, but states themselves struggle with their own fiscal 
 
 
 100. Anderson, supra note 40, at 1215 (noting that the argument for state bailouts on pension 
liabilities is stronger in cities that have lost population to their metropolitan areas or to the rest of the 
state). 
 101. Philo, supra note 48, at 87 (citing Michigan as an example). 
 102. See Kimhi, supra note 37, at 901–05. 
 103. Id. at 888–891. 
 104. Id. at 902–04 (citing Philadelphia/PICA as an example). 
 105. Id. at 910. See supra Part I.B, for more on these processes. 
 106. Eide, supra note 32, at 8–9. 
 107. Kimhi, supra note 32, at 885, 906. 
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issues, and, as discussed in Part I.D, these struggles reverberate on the local 
level, exacerbating rather than minimizing municipal distress.108 Thus, 
chapter 9 may be valuable when both a municipality and its state are in 
crisis: a municipality that gains fiscal strength as a result of chapter 9 is 
likely to be able to withstand reduced aid from a struggling state.109 
There are also drawbacks to state boards. To be effective, state boards 
need investments of time, money, and resources, and states that lack one or 
more of these requirements may find that the boards they have set up cannot 
provide effective relief. Not all states have boards or debt adjustment 
programs in place for their municipalities, and some states may be so 
concerned with their own fiscal health that they will not be able to assist 
their struggling cities and towns. State officials can also clash with local 
officials, which in turn can hurt city finances and create more management 
problems.110 Thus, although state relief clearly can play a valuable role in 
alleviating municipal distress, there is a role for the federal government to 
play when problems arise that the state cannot resolve or when the state 
itself is not in a position to provide effective relief. Unfortunately, as 
discussed further below, states too often view federal municipal bankruptcy 
as a threat to be feared and avoided, rather than a tool that should be utilized 
under specific circumstances.  
2. The Benefits of Federal Relief 
Municipalities should turn to bankruptcy law when they need targeted 
relief that chapter 9 is designed to provide: breathing space, and the need to 
overcome a holdout creditor or otherwise modify agreements on a non-
consensual basis.111 The ability to impair pensions has recently become an 
important issue in the municipal distress context, as many cities and towns 
are struggling with underfunded pension obligations, as described in Part 
I.B. Although some municipalities, such as those in Illinois, have tried to 
use state law to modify executory obligations, their efforts have been 
unsuccessful.112 Bankruptcy may be a good option for these municipalities, 
 
 
 108. For example, the city of Chicago’s distress affects the State of Illinois, and vice versa. 
 109. See Murray, supra note 22 at 10 (noting that struggling states often reduce aid to local 
governments). 
 110. See Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as 
a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 634–35 (1995) (describing one 
such clash in the context of Bridgeport mayors and the Bridgeport Financial Review Board). Brown also 
describes how state officials can be motivated by their own political interests and not the best interests 
of the city’s citizens. Id. at 642–43. 
 111. For a fuller discussion of this concept, see Coordes, supra note 19, at 308, 311, 350. 
 112. See Meaghan Kilroy, Illinois Pension Reform Law Unconstitutional, State Supreme Court 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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particularly in the face of creditors who resist any attempt to reduce their 
claims.  
When a city’s problems are rooted in modifiable obligations, whether 
labor spending, bond payments, or benefit responsibilities, these cities may 
be prime candidates for chapter 9’s nonconsensual debt adjustment tools.113 
The benefit of having an experienced bankruptcy judge to oversee the debt 
adjustment process and ensure that it is orderly, legally sound, and fair, 
should also not be overlooked.114 The municipal bankruptcy process can 
thus be a viable solution for resolving problems with modifiable obligations, 
whose positive effects may extend beyond saving the municipality itself.115 
This is not to say that every municipality facing unsustainable debt or 
labor obligations should always file for bankruptcy. Rather, when a 
municipality is facing these problems, officials should consider filing for 
bankruptcy by asking whether the municipality needs the distinct forms of 
relief bankruptcy can provide, or whether its problems can be better 
resolved through state mechanisms. If it is determined that a municipality 
does need bankruptcy relief, the state and federal governments should not 
create further impediments for the municipality to access this relief. 
C. Other Considerations for Chapter 9 Relief 
At this point, a few other observations concerning chapter 9’s role in 
resolving municipal distress should be made. The first is that a key 
advantage of filing for chapter 9 lies in preventing the cycle of mobile 
capital flight described in Part I. Recall that when a municipality raises taxes 
or decreases the services it provides, it risks driving out employers and 
consumers and reducing its tax base. This in turn makes further tax increases 
 
 
Rules, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (May 8, 2015 12:01 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/ 
20150508/ONLINE/150509891/illinois-pension-reform-law-unconstitutional-state-supreme-court-
rules. 
 113. See Malito, supra note 17 (describing the city of Vallejo, California’s problems).  
 114. See Frank Shafroth, Municipal Bankruptcy is Large, Complicated, & Seemingly Unending, 
GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Sept. 10, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/ 
2015/09/10/municipal-bankruptcy-is-large-complicated-seemingly-unending/ (describing Puerto Rico’s 
proposed out-of-court restructuring plan and the complications it faces because it is unable to use the 
bankruptcy process). 
 115. See, e.g., Frank Shafroth, Steep Roads to Municipal Solvency, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/09/17/steep-roads-to-
municipal-solvency/ (noting that Wayne County’s consent agreement fails to address problems with the 
county’s underfunded pension system); Desmond Lachman, Puerto Rico Needs a Bankruptcy 
Framework, AEIDEAS (Sept. 17, 2015, 11:44 AM), https://www.aei.org/publication/puerto-rico-needs-
a-bankruptcy-framework/ (contrasting an “orderly bankruptcy procedure” with a “disorderly asset 
grab”). 
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more onerous on those who remain. Although chapter 9 can be used to help 
prevent these causes of financial distress by allowing a municipality to 
avoid tax increases or service decreases, the eligibility rules, discussed more 
fully below, currently impede its ability to do so. Chapter 9 is frequently 
decried as an ineffective mechanism for eliminating the causes of fiscal 
distress; however, if used in conjunction with state measures, it can help 
municipalities modify unsustainable obligations before they become 
unwieldy, leaving a place for state and local government to design further 
measures for addressing distress or avoiding it in the future.116 
Relatedly, the question of whether a municipality should file for 
bankruptcy relief is inextricably linked to the question of when a 
municipality should file. Timing matters in resolving municipal fiscal 
distress.117 The literature indicates that municipal and even state officials 
may delay bankruptcy relief or avoid it entirely.118 As discussed further in 
Part III, the current eligibility rules do nothing to address this delay, as they 
fail to help a bankruptcy judge distinguish municipalities that have 
bankruptcy-specific problems from those that do not.119 Instead, the 
eligibility rules, and the litigation that frequently results from them, further 
discourage officials from utilizing the bankruptcy process. 
This discouragement is problematic because waiting too long to file for 
bankruptcy relief when relief is needed can worsen a municipality’s 
situation.120 Trying to simply cope with fiscal distress without proactively 
 
 
 116. JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT 6 
(2012) (“The limited but vital role of the bankruptcy court is to supervise the effective and appropriate 
adjustment of municipal debt. . . . Historically, Chapter IX and its successor Chapter 9 were intended to 
facilitate rather than mandate voluntary municipal debt adjustment and not municipal debt 
elimination.”). 
 117. Cf. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. 
REV. 205, 208-10 (2014) (discussing the importance of timing in the chapter 11 context); see also Laura 
Litvan, Puerto Rico Debt Measure Pressed by Democrats, Citing Zika Virus, BNA BANKR. L. REP., 
May 4, 2015, 28 BKY 557 (“The cost of delay [of bankruptcy relief] is you get to the point where there’s 
nothing to restructure.” (quoting Jacob J. Lew, Treasury Secretary).  
 118. See Feibelman, supra note 97, at 82 (noting that sovereign governments predictably delay or 
avoid seeking debt relief when they suffer financial distress); see also Leon R. Barson & Francis J. 
Lawall, Chapter 9 Bankruptcy: Restructuring Municipalities in Financial Distress, in CHAPTER 9 
BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, 
COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 7 (Aspatore 2011), 2011 
WL 5053630, at *8 (“It appears that almost every state has taken steps to try to avoid the filing of a 
Chapter 9 within its borders.”). 
 119. See Anderson, supra note 40, at 1155 (noting that, although it would make sense if the choice 
among bankruptcy, state programs, and judicial receiverships depended on the nature of the city’s fiscal 
distress, “states rarely offer more than one of the three systems to manage insolvency” due to politics, 
history, and ideology). 
 120. Id. at 1158 (noting that officials who resort to a “hasty sale” of assets as a way of delaying 
bankruptcy may get fire sale prices, and cutting services only delays opportunities for more robust 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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addressing the causes can exacerbate a collective action problem: as 
Michelle Anderson points out, when each creditor individually pursues its 
interest in full repayment, creditors as a group force inefficient liquidation 
of municipal assets as well as spending cuts that diminish the municipality’s 
ability to pay other creditors.121 As a result, creditors as a whole are worse 
off.122 The potential for a collective action problem demonstrates that 
bankruptcy should not be the “last resort” that it is so commonly described 
to be.123 Rather than being allowed to persist, when collective action 
problems develop, they should be halted by the federal bankruptcy 
mechanism, which enables a municipality to create a plan to maximize the 
share allocated to each creditor and to implement that plan over the 
objections of a holdout creditor.  
Given the difficulties that arise with delaying bankruptcy, a change in 
the way municipal bankruptcy is viewed is necessary. Instead of being seen 
as a comprehensive distress solution, bankruptcy should instead be viewed 
as a mechanism that can provide effective solutions to a set of specific, 
identifiable problems. Viewed in this light, bankruptcy is not a catch-all 
solution, nor an admission of failure. Instead, it is a mobilization of specific 
federal tools, to be used in conjunction with state programs and other forms 
of assistance, to resolve municipal distress and allow cities to reinvest in 
basic public services.124 The law cannot change the rhetoric surrounding 
municipal bankruptcy, but it can provide better incentives to file for 
bankruptcy and thereby demonstrate when bankruptcy will be an effective 
solution. Over time, changes in the law may in turn effect changes in the 
way bankruptcy is viewed and discussed. 
Identifying the points at which bankruptcy is better suited than state 
relief for a municipality helps drive the creation of chapter 9 rules and 
procedures that are conducive to facilitating successful relief. Despite state 
 
 
recovery). 
 121. Id. at 1190; see also Kasia Klimasinska, Puerto Rico Debt Crisis Eludes U.S. Fix, Top 
Republican Says, BNA BANKR. L. REP., Oct. 1, 2015, 27 BKY 1312 (describing how bankruptcy access 
for Puerto Rico “could avoid a protracted legal fight by allowing the government to restructure some 
debt in court, rather than through individual negotiations”). 
 122. Anderson, supra note 40, at 1190. 
 123. See Frank Shafroth, Avoiding Municipal Insolvency, Except as a Last Resort, GMU MUN. 
SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Oct. 20, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/10/20/ 
avoiding-municipal-insolvency-except-as-a-last-resort/ (“I don’t use the bankruptcy word except as a 
very, very last resort . . . that solution could be much more expensive.” (quoting Michigan Governor 
Rick Snyder)). 
 124. To some extent, bankruptcy is already being utilized in this manner. For example, the Grand 
Bargain in Detroit was a coalition of state, local, and federal actors working together to save the city. 
See also Moringiello, supra note 79 (stressing the complementary nature of chapter 9 and state 
governance). 
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programs’ significant and varied attributes, bankruptcy has a clear and 
valuable role to play in resolving municipal fiscal distress, a role that must 
be reflected in the chapter 9 eligibility rules. 
III. LESSONS FROM ELIGIBILITY STRUGGLES 
To demonstrate the need for the changes advocated in Part IV, this Part 
begins by describing how the current municipal bankruptcy eligibility rules 
provide unnecessary roadblocks, discouraging municipalities from seeking 
bankruptcy relief when that relief is arguably needed. 
In addition to laying out the rules governing chapter 9 eligibility and plan 
confirmation, this Part examines recent decisions from several chapter 9 
filings. It illustrates that other chapter 9 safeguards provide the bankruptcy 
judge with many ways to prevent opportunistic bankruptcy plans and 
filings. Furthermore, many issues that arise at the eligibility stage are re-
hashed during the confirmation stage. The confirmation decisions, in 
particular, illustrate how adept bankruptcy courts have become at carefully 
considering the efficacy and fairness of municipal plans of adjustment, as 
well as the interests of all stakeholders involved in a chapter 9 
bankruptcy.125 
A. Rules and Examples 
1. Eligibility and Confirmation Rules 
If a municipality wants to file for bankruptcy, it must comply with the 
eligibility rules, which are found in § 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Upon 
filing for bankruptcy, a chapter 9 debtor must show that it satisfies all of 
these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.126 The eligibility 
rules may therefore be thought of as the “gatekeepers” for a municipality’s 
entry into bankruptcy. 
There are five primary eligibility requirements: (1) the entity must be a 
municipality as defined in the Bankruptcy Code (the “municipality 
 
 
 125. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1152 (“These episodes have revealed that bankruptcy courts 
can balance the interests of the various stakeholders—creditors, pensioners, the state, and residents—
involved when municipalities face fiscal distress.”). 
 126. Allan H. Ickowitz & Robert S. McWorter, Understanding the Unique Challenges of Chapter 
9 Cases, in REPRESENTING CREDITORS IN CHAPTER 9 MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: LEADING LAWYERS 
ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING 
RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 87 (Aspatore 2014), 2014 WL 4785318, at *8 (“The Chapter 9 debtor has 
the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that it satisfies the eligibility 
requirements.”). 
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requirement”); (2) the entity must be specifically authorized to be a debtor 
under state law, meaning state law must exist or be sought specifically 
granting the municipality, either by type or by name, the ability to file (the 
“authorization requirement”); (3 the entity must be insolvent, meaning it 
either is not paying its debts as they become due or is unable to pay its debts 
as they become due127 (the “insolvency requirement”); (4) the entity must 
desire to effect a plan of adjustment (the “plan requirement”); and (5) the 
entity must (a) obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority 
in amount of the claims of each class that will be impaired under its plan; 
(b) negotiate in good faith with creditors; (c) demonstrate that it is unable 
to negotiate with creditors due to impracticality; or (d) reasonably believe 
that a creditor may try to be the recipient of a transfer that would otherwise 
be avoidable as a preference (the “creditor negotiation requirement”).128 In 
addition to these five requirements, § 921(c) of the Bankruptcy Code allows 
a court to dismiss a chapter 9 petition if the debtor did not file the petition 
in good faith or meet other Code requirements (the “good faith 
requirement”).129  
After a municipal debtor has been deemed eligible for relief, it must 
submit a plan of debt adjustment to the bankruptcy court for confirmation, 
or approval. The confirmation standards are contained in § 943 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.130 These standards incorporate many of the standards for 
confirming a plan in chapter 11 bankruptcy,131 and the municipality is often 
required to produce substantial evidence in support of the confirmability of 
its plan.132 Briefly, a plan must be proposed in good faith. If the plan seeks 
to impair creditors, or pay them less than what they are otherwise owed, at 
least one impaired class of creditors must accept the plan. If the judge is 
tasked with “cramming down,” or approving the plan over the objection of 
a class of creditors, the judge must find that the plan does not discriminate 
unfairly and that it is fair and equitable. The plan must also generally 
conform to bankruptcy priority provisions, and the debtor must not be 
prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan. 
 
 
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2012). 
 128. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). 
 129. See id. § 921(c). 
 130. 11 U.S.C. § 943 (2012). 
 131. Specifically, § 943(b)(1) indicates that a plan must comply with bankruptcy provisions made 
applicable by § 901. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(1) (2012). Section 901(a) provides that many of the chapter 11 
plan confirmation requirements apply in chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012). This includes, for 
example, the good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3). Id. 
 132. Jacoby, supra note 77, at 62 (“The plan confirmation requirements are multi-faceted, and 
notoriously controversial as applied to a municipality.”). 
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The judge must also find that the plan is in the best interests of creditors and 
is feasible.133 
The eligibility and plan confirmation requirements are compatible with 
each other in many ways. As the following subsections will show, many 
issues requiring similar considerations arise at both the eligibility and 
confirmation stages. 
2. Eligibility and Confirmation Decisions 
Recent chapter 9 cases illustrate both the care judges take in determining 
whether a municipality’s plan of adjustment is confirmable and the way in 
which creditors use hearings on eligibility to raise issues that are ultimately 
determined at the confirmation stage. 
The plan confirmation decision in Detroit’s bankruptcy demonstrates 
both the high bar municipalities face when trying to confirm a plan of 
adjustment and the rigorous approval process that the plan must undergo. 
The judge took over 100 pages to make detailed findings as to whether 
Detroit’s plan was in the best interest of creditors, feasible, proposed in good 
faith, and whether it discriminated unfairly in favor of pension creditors.134 
The judge appointed an expert specifically to investigate and testify to the 
plan’s feasibility,135 and numerous other consultants advised the judge and 
the city on plan confirmation.136 As part of the plan confirmation 
proceedings, the judge also held a hearing specifically for individual 
objectors, even inviting some individuals to present evidence.137 The 
judge’s substantial involvement and investment in plan confirmation 
demonstrates that the hurdles to Detroit confirming a plan of adjustment 
were quite high.  
Nevertheless, the judge’s detailed opinion merely reiterated many of the 
same conclusions that he had drawn at the eligibility stage of the 
proceedings. In the Detroit bankruptcy, the court considered 110 objections 
 
 
 133. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7); Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1160 (“[A] municipality that desires 
to exit Chapter 9 must submit to the court a plan that is ‘feasible,’ which courts increasingly have 
interpreted to mean that ‘the debtor can accomplish what the plan proposes and provide governmental 
services.’”). 
 134. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 ((Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 135. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1197 (“The bankruptcy judge appointed an independent 
expert to assess the feasibility of Detroit’s restructuring proposal.”). 
 136. Jacoby, supra note 77 at 96. 
 137. Lisa Lambert, Detroit Trial Ends, Judge to Rule Nov. 7 on Bankruptcy Plan, REUTERS (Oct. 
27, 2014, 7:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/27/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-
idUSKBN0IG22Q20141027. 
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to eligibility alone,138 many of which required substantial discovery, which 
further delayed the court’s decision.139 In the confirmation decision, the 
bankruptcy judge observed that both before and after the eligibility decision, 
“nearly every creditor group filed litigation against the City seeking the full 
protection of its claims.”140 The judge also referenced his eligibility decision 
several times, citing back to it as addressing issues related to the fair and 
equitable confirmation requirement,141 the requirement that no law prohibits 
the debtor from carrying out its plan,142 the city’s good faith,143 and the 
unfair discrimination confirmation standard.144 
An expert involved in Jefferson County, Alabama’s chapter 9 
proceedings directly acknowledged that creditors use eligibility hearings as 
a way to conduct extensive discovery, deplete the debtor’s resources, and 
force it to capitulate to creditor demands.145 Thus, creditors can use 
eligibility hearings to drive up costs while raising issues that are ultimately 
better addressed during confirmation hearings. In Jefferson County’s case, 
the judge confirmed the county’s plan after 14 hours of courtroom 
arguments and made a specific finding that the plan was affordable for the 
county.146 
The deliberations in Detroit and Jefferson County demonstrate that 
judges make careful, considered decisions with respect to plan 
confirmation. In addition, many of the issues that can be raised at the 
eligibility stage may be decided again at the confirmation stage. For 
example, the issue of good faith arises at both the eligibility stage and the 
plan confirmation stage. Similarly, issues relating to state authorization can 
arise at both stages: at the eligibility stage, the debtor must show that the 
state has authorized it to file, and at the confirmation stage, the debtor must 
 
 
 138. LAN W. KORNBERG ET AL., PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, 
BANKRUPTCY COURT HOLDS THAT DETROIT IS ELIGIBLE TO FILE FOR CHAPTER 9 PROTECTION (2013), 
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/2215871/11dec13memo.pdf. 
 139. Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 858 
(2014) (noting that the “greater volume of discovery . . . produced a series of disagreements requiring 
court intervention” in the Detroit bankruptcy). 
 140. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 160 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 141. Id. at 180–81. 
 142. Id. at 211. 
 143. Id. at 247 (“This is the second time during this chapter 9 case that the Court has been called 
upon to examine the City’s good faith.”). 
 144. Id. at 256–57. 
 145. Barnett Wright, A Year in Bankruptcy: A Jefferson County Story, AL.COM, (Nov. 9, 2012, 1:30 
PM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2012/11/a_year_in_bankruptcy_a_jeffers.html. 
 146. Katy Stech, Judge Approves Jefferson County, Ala., Bankruptcy-Restructuring Plan, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2013, 7:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023043374045792 
12553163071992. 
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demonstrate that its plan is authorized and not prohibited under state law. 
Although the eligibility and confirmation standards are duplicative in 
many ways, concerns remain that the confirmation standards do not provide 
sufficiently robust protections for creditors. Therefore, creditors may raise 
inappropriate arguments at the eligibility stage, as alluded to by the judge 
in Jefferson County’s bankruptcy, because they may feel that this is their 
best opportunity to protect their interests. Plan confirmation standards 
should indeed be strengthened and clarified so that creditors know that their 
interests are being given careful consideration. Indeed, scholars have 
already begun to propose changes for the chapter 9 plan confirmation 
standards,147 and more robust confirmation rules certainly deserve attention. 
Although more work may be needed to further develop these standards,148 
of the two proceedings, confirmation is far better suited to protect creditors 
than eligibility. This is because, at the confirmation stage, the municipality 
has a plan of adjustment that it must justify to the judge. At confirmation, 
therefore, the judge has a detailed roadmap of which creditor interests will 
actually be impaired, which will be protected, and the municipality’s 
reasons for its decisions. In contrast, at the eligibility stage, it is often too 
early to accurately determine the debtor’s plans. As can be observed in the 
Detroit and Jefferson County bankruptcies, creditor objections raised at this 
stage may be speculative or may simply duplicate concerns raised at a later 
stage in the case.  
Thus, the eligibility requirements largely replicate the process the 
municipality has to endure at the end of its bankruptcy, during the plan 
confirmation process. The best interests of creditors and fair and equitable 
tests for plan confirmation reflect many of the same concerns that arise in 
the insolvency analysis at the eligibility stage.149 And the good faith 
 
 
 147. See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State 
Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71 (2015) (proposing a clearer role for state choices in the bankruptcy 
process while acknowledging that this role may not always help interpret the chapter 9 confirmation 
standards); Dawson, supra note 79 (arguing that a court should grant more flexibility to a municipal 
debtor with respect to the unfair discrimination standard in chapter 9); Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. 
Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 25 (2015) 
(analyzing the law defining the unfair discrimination standard in chapter 9). 
 148. Some of this work has already begun in the court system. See, e.g., Stephanie Cumings, 
Stockton’s Bankruptcy Plan Safe from Unhappy Creditors, BNA BANKR. L. REP., Dec. 11, 2015, (stating 
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s determination that the best interests of the creditors test 
“considers the collective interests of all concerned creditors in a municipal plan of adjustment rather 
than focusing on the claims of individual creditors” (quoting Franklin High Yield Tax-Free Income Fund 
v. City of Stockton (In re City of Stockton), 542 B.R. 261, 286 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015)). 
 149. See John Patrick Hunt, Taxes and Ability to Pay in Municipal Bankruptcy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
515, 539, 561 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (“The requirement that the composition be in the ‘best interests 
of the creditors’ also reflects the view that municipalities should pay all they can toward their debts. . . . 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
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requirement strongly overlaps with many of the eligibility requirements as 
well.150 Thus, even a municipality that makes a filing for opportunistic 
reasons will face significant costs and challenges throughout the bankruptcy 
process, and these debtors will face particular scrutiny at the confirmation 
stage.151 
3. Unnecessary Deterrence 
The core functions of municipal bankruptcy law—nonconsensual debt 
adjustment, relief from holdout creditors, and breathing space—all suggest 
that bankruptcy should not be the first option a struggling municipality 
invokes. These functions instead indicate that a municipality should be 
unable to work with or reach an agreement with its creditors prior to 
entering bankruptcy. The eligibility rules are designed to encourage this 
result, prohibiting entry into bankruptcy for those municipalities that have 
not first tried to reach a consensual resolution with creditors.  
Yet, few if any municipalities are eager to rush into bankruptcy. 
Currently, concerns over stigma and other ill effects—real or perceived—
resulting from a bankruptcy filing already make it a safe bet that 
municipalities will not turn to bankruptcy as an initial option. As Skeel and 
Gillette observe, “No mayor wants to be the one who has put his or her city 
in bankruptcy.”152 Additionally, the high costs of bankruptcy proceedings 
serve to deter many municipalities that cannot perceive benefits that 
outweigh the costs.153 Finally, the standards in chapter 9 for plan 
 
 
Commentators have noted that the ‘fair and equitable’ standard may require more of taxpayers than the 
insolvency standard for bankruptcy eligibility . . . .”). 
 150. Cf. id. at 552 (“[C]ourts occasionally have emphasized a distinction between insolvency and 
good faith.”) (emphasis added). In the Stockton and Detroit bankruptcies, the courts found that the cities 
established a presumption of good faith once they had met the other eligibility requirements. In re City 
of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 795 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013); In re City of Detroit, 594 B.R. 97, 180–81 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 151. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 466 (1993) (“[U]nsecured creditors of 
municipalities are protected from the moral hazard problem of opportunistic bankruptcy filings . . . by 
the best interests of the creditors standard.”). 
 152. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1183; but see Frank Shafroth, Municipal Default & 
Consequences, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Aug. 6, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.word 
press.com/2015/08/06/municipal-default-consequences/ (quoting a statement from Moody’s suggesting 
that there may be less stigma today). 
 153. For a fuller discussion of these costs, see generally Coordes, supra note 19; see also Frank 
Shafroth, Fiscal & Physical Resilience in the Wake of Terrorism, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT 
(Dec. 8, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/12/08/fiscal-physical-resiliency-in-the-
wake-of-terrorism/ (“We can too easily forget that while municipal bankruptcy provides a means for a 
municipality to shed some of its debt in order to ensure continuity in the provision of essential public 
services, it comes at a burdensome cost—and leaves residual fiscal challenges.”). 
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confirmation direct the bankruptcy judge to thoroughly scrutinize a 
municipal debtor’s plan of adjustment for opportunism. Duplicative 
scrutiny at the beginning of a municipal bankruptcy is not necessary. 
The analysis in Part II indicates that bankruptcy is designed to address 
specific problems related to a municipality’s fiscal health, problems that 
state solutions cannot adequately resolve. When a municipality is exhibiting 
these problems, its access to bankruptcy relief should be straightforward. 
Yet, this is not the case under present law. Instead of getting access to the 
relief they need, cities either wait to file until their troubles become more 
difficult to resolve from a bankruptcy standpoint, or they file and 
subsequently struggle to gain access to bankruptcy court due to the daunting 
eligibility requirements.154 
This Article therefore contends that the eligibility requirements 
unnecessarily deter chapter 9 filings.155 These requirements were designed 
to prevent federal relief from infringing on state power; however, in 
practice, they have enabled states to prohibit beneficial municipal 
bankruptcy filings out of pure fear.156 Given the existing incentives state and 
municipal officials have to delay a bankruptcy filing,157 the eligibility rules 
only provide further, unnecessary incentives to delay. This results in 
increased transaction costs for municipalities that are already financially 
strained. 
Cities that wait to file for bankruptcy long after their creditors have dug 
in their heels may find their struggles intensifying. Relationships with 
creditors may grow acrimonious. Cities that resort to hasty asset sales have 
less to offer their creditors in bankruptcy.158 And if a city reduces public 
services, its tax base (and key source of revenue) may ultimately decline, 
 
 
 154. See generally John J. Rapisardi et al., Chapter 9: A Big Stick, Rarely Used, in CHAPTER 9 
BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, 
COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 153 (Aspatore 2011), 
2011 WL 5053639. 
 155. See generally Malito, supra note 17 (making a similar assertion with respect to two specific 
eligibility requirements).  
 156. See Rapisardi, supra note 154, at *8 (describing the situation in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania); see 
also infra Part III.C. 
 157. See, e.g., Frank Shafroth, The Importance of Being Earnest for a Municipality in Federal 
Bankruptcy Court, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Sept. 21, 2015), https://fiscal 
bankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/the-importance-of-being-earnest-for-a-municipality-in-federal-
bankruptcy-court/ (describing the complications and costs inherent in San Bernardino’s bankruptcy 
process). 
 158. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 40, at 1121–22 (citing hasty sales in Benton Harbor, Michigan, 
where twenty-two acres of the city’s lakeshore and dunes were transferred in exchange for public space 
that required industrial decontamination prior to public use, and in Newark, New Jersey, where the 
mayor sold sixteen city buildings to plug an $80 hole in the budget but noting that the sale will ultimately 
cost the city $125 million to lease back the buildings). 
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making it even harder for the city to produce a viable plan of debt 
adjustment, whether inside bankruptcy or out. 
Several cities have arguably waited too long to file for bankruptcy or are 
nearing the point where bankruptcy may become less effective for them. As 
discussed in the Introduction, the closure of multiple casinos in Atlantic City 
has resulted in a vast reduction of capital sources, meaning that Atlantic City 
might have little to offer creditors even if it were to file for bankruptcy. In 
Chicago, the combination of high debt and severe pension underfunding 
would seem to make the city a perfect candidate for bankruptcy, yet the 
city’s proffered solution—tax hikes—may simply drive more residents (and 
revenue sources) out of the city once implemented.159 And in North Las 
Vegas, Nevada, property tax revenue has decreased 70% since 2009, and 
the city has been frantically trying to strike deals with its unions over 
liabilities for back pay and raises in order to avert looming insolvency.160 
Each of these cities may well benefit from bankruptcy, but must quickly 
recognize bankruptcy’s benefits in order to take advantage of the shrinking 
window of opportunity they will have to maximize those benefits. 
B. Problems Stemming from Specific Eligibility Requirements 
The eligibility rules provide fruitful avenues for creditor objections that 
may impede a municipality’s access to needed relief. In the eligibility phase 
of the Detroit bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy judge contended with 
many objections regarding whether Detroit’s filing had been in good faith. 
In his analysis, Judge Rhodes examined correspondence indicating that 
Detroit had been contemplating a bankruptcy filing for a long time; 
however, the judge also noted that Detroit had delayed filing in order to 
engage in negotiations with creditors, negotiations that proved fruitless 
because the creditors refused to budge.161 The judge thus observed that by 
putting off filing to go through the motions of negotiating with creditors 
who were refusing to make concessions, Detroit had likely done more harm 
than good. In Detroit’s case, therefore, the good faith and creditor 
negotiation eligibility requirements had incentivized city officials to delay 
filing long after they recognized that the city needed federal relief.162  
 
 
 159. Dabrowski, supra note 9. 
 160. Nash, supra note 9. 
 161. Halcom, supra note 2. 
 162. Of course, waiting to file also provides officials with a rationale to support their moves toward 
impairing debt in bankruptcy: that they have tried everything else, but nothing else has worked. 
Nevertheless, this type of reasoning neglects an understanding of the distinct role that bankruptcy can 
play in resolving a discrete set of municipal problems. See infra Part III.D for further explanation of this 
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The creditor negotiation and plan requirements are also easily 
manipulated, to the point where they can become irrelevant. For example, 
when the city of San Bernardino, California filed for bankruptcy, the court 
found that it had filed in good faith despite also finding “that the city did not 
engage in meaningful” negotiations with creditors, made “significant cash-
out payments to terminated employees” just prior to filing, and was not in 
any way prepared to formulate a plan of adjustment.163 The state 
authorization requirement can also be manipulated, as illustrated by In re 
New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., where the state and the court 
permitted a corporation to file for chapter 9 because of the debtor 
corporation’s “paramount importance to the public interest.”164 
In other cases, the insolvency requirement stands between a city and 
needed relief. The City of Bridgeport, Connecticut provides an example of 
a court struggling with the meaning of the insolvency requirement. The 
court determined that Bridgeport was “financially distressed,” but 
ultimately not insolvent.165 Yet, Bridgeport was in clear dire straits: its 
police force was overwhelmed, crime was high, its roads could not be 
maintained, and the city’s trash could not be collected.166 This was a 
situation that almost certainly would meet the more flexible definition of 
service-delivery insolvency embraced by some courts today.167 
Furthermore, Bridgeport residents at the time paid the highest taxes in the 
state,168 meaning that raising taxes to alleviate insolvency would likely be 
quite difficult. The bankruptcy judge declared that “[c]hapter 9 is not 
available to a city simply because it is financially distressed,” but a few 
sentences later stated that “[c]hapter 9 is intended to enable a financially 
distressed city to ‘continue to provide its residents with essential services 
such as police protection, fire protection, sewage and garbage removal, and 
schools . . . ,’ while it works out a plan to adjust its debts and obligations.”169 
And the court ultimately concluded that “Bridgeport was undoubtedly in 
 
 
role.  
 163. Ickowitz & McWorter, supra note 125, at *7. 
 164. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 434 B.R. 131, 145 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting 
2008 N.Y. LAWS 3083); see also Christine A. Schleppegrell, Ad Hoc Legislation Creates Barriers to a 
Chapter 9 Filing, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2013, at 48, 89 (discussing the case); infra Part III. C 
(describing how Pennsylvania state officials changed the state’s authorization law to prohibit Harrisburg 
from filing). 
 165. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 335, 338 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
 166. Id. at 335. 
 167. See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 781 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (discussing 
“service delivery insolvency”); In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (same). 
 168. Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 335. 
 169. Id. at 336–37 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011 (1988), 
as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4116. 
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deep financial trouble when it filed its [chapter 9] petition.”170 If chapter 9’s 
purpose is to allow cities to continue to provide residents with basic public 
services, as the court suggested, it remains a puzzle as to why Bridgeport, a 
city that was clearly struggling to maintain these services at even a 
minimum level, was deemed ineligible to file.171 
Even for cities that are ultimately found to be insolvent, the insolvency 
requirement is “fact-intensive and leaves considerable room for dispute and 
the potential for protracted litigation.”172 In the city of Vallejo, California’s 
bankruptcy, for example, the city’s unions argued that the city was not 
insolvent because it could have accepted the unions’ offer and operated with 
a balanced budget for another year.173 Although the court ultimately rejected 
this argument, it provided a fruitful avenue for the unions to object to and 
stall Vallejo’s access to relief, as the unions appealed the bankruptcy court’s 
initial decision in the city’s favor to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel, which ruled against the unions a year later.174 
As illustrated in Parts I and II, bankruptcy relief may not be the solution 
for every municipality. Yet, the eligibility rules do not provide an accurate 
mechanism for determining when bankruptcy relief is appropriate. Instead, 
these requirements present an array of problems: they discourage relief 
when it may be suitable, are easily manipulated to allow relief when it may 
be inappropriate, and open the door to costly and time-consuming litigation 
in almost every case. 
C. State Hurdles 
Perhaps no eligibility rule is as daunting as the state authorization 
requirement, which enables a state to prohibit a municipality from filing for 
bankruptcy, regardless of its financial condition. For example, the Governor 
of Illinois has publicly stated that the Chicago school system may need to 
file for bankruptcy; however, under Illinois law, the school system is not 
authorized to file.175 The school system’s difficulties are also affecting the 
 
 
 170. Id. at 339. 
 171. For further discussion of the Bridgeport insolvency determination, see Vincent S.J. Buccola, 
Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 
33), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534856 (describing extra-statutory 
“temporal limitation” on insolvency imposed by court to block Bridgeport from filing for bankruptcy). 
 172. Denniston, supra note 45, at 267; see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1182 (“Since 
municipalities have access to tax revenues, the insolvency requirement can be very difficult to meet, 
even for a municipality in dire financial straits.”). 
 173. Denniston, supra note 45, at 267. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Brian Chappatta, Chicago Schools Haunted by Bankruptcy Chatter Ahead of Bond Sale, 
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city of Chicago, which is now itself facing financial difficulty.176 But 
Chicago may also have a hard time accessing bankruptcy relief, as Illinois 
law requires even eligible municipalities to clear several procedural hurdles 
before they file for bankruptcy, many of which are out of the municipality’s 
control.177 Illinois also requires municipalities to exhaust state relief 
mechanisms prior to filing for bankruptcy.178 Given these restrictions on 
filing, it appears that Illinois, rather than embracing bankruptcy as a form 
of relief distinct from that which the state can provide, views bankruptcy as 
a threat to state action.179 
The bankruptcy eligibility requirements are daunting for a reason: they 
are designed to ensure that municipal officials think carefully before putting 
a municipality into bankruptcy and to prevent unnecessary federal 
infringement on state affairs.180 But many states have used the state 
authorization requirement to add their own conditions to the eligibility rules, 
making it nearly impossible for the municipality to access relief until after 
it has already begun to decline significantly.181 As a result, chapter 9 is not 
used as much as it should be.182 
States impose so many of their own requirements because they want to 
avoid a municipal bankruptcy if at all possible.183 State governments may 
be concerned about contagion, or one municipal bankruptcy’s negative 
effects on nearby communities.184 Although there is minimal evidence of 
actual contagion when a municipality’s fiscal health declines,185 the 
 
 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 21, 2015, 2:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-21/ 
chicago-schools-haunted-by-bankruptcy-chatter-ahead-of-bond-sale. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See JAMES A. CHATZ, ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP, FINANCIAL REFORM FOR MUNICIPALITIES IN 
ILLINOIS 2–4, http://www.iml.org/file.cfm?key=4115. 
 178. Id. at 4–6. 
 179. But cf. Moringiello, supra note 79, at 407–08 (arguing that states should view bankruptcy as 
complementary to state intervention rather than as an alternative). 
 180. See Mary L. Young, Keeping a Municipal Foot in the Chapter 9 Door: Eligibility 
Requirements for Municipal Bankruptcies, 23 CAL. BANKR. J. 309, 314 (1997) (noting that this provides 
a measure of protection for municipal investors). 
 181. See generally Frost, supra note17, at 267 (describing different “gatekeeper” roles for states). 
 182. See Barson & Lawall, supra note 118, at *6 (“Chapter 9 is arguably underutilized.”). 
 183. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in 
Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525, 551–52 (2013) (citing Central Falls and Jefferson 
County as examples). 
 184. Id.; see also Schleppegrell, supra note 161, at 49 (discussing the Rhode Island governor’s 
statement opposing a city’s petition for a judicial receivership because it would create a “domino effect” 
among other struggling Rhode Island cities and towns). 
 185. See Stefano Rossi & Hayong Yun, What Drives Financial Reform? Economics and Politics of 
the State-Level Adoption of Municipal Bankruptcy Laws 27 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698665 [https://perma.cc/59NE-A2VK] (noting 
that municipalities actually enjoy lower borrowing costs after their state authorizes chapter 9). 
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perception of contagion is nevertheless quite powerful.186 Unfortunately, 
this fear of contagion often pushes the municipality in the wrong direction, 
as contagion is more likely to arise in cases of severe fiscal distress as a 
result of not filing for chapter 9 and getting needed relief. This is because a 
domino effect occurs when a municipality is forced to cut services in order 
to repay creditors: lack of funding for essential public services, for example, 
results in higher crime and overcrowded hospitals and prisons.187 High 
crime and overcrowding can in turn affect neighboring areas, and these 
problems may be more difficult to overcome than problems states may fear 
from a bankruptcy filing, such as a temporary credit downgrade.188 
The specific authorization eligibility requirement allows states to play 
into the idea of bankruptcy as a failure and to erect whatever barriers or 
alternatives they can imagine.189 When Congress amended the Bankruptcy 
Code in 1994, it required states to affirmatively create authorization 
mechanisms for their municipalities without giving them any guidance 
about when bankruptcy would help a municipality or what form those 
authorization mechanisms should take.190 As a result, specific authorization 
more often bars an otherwise eligible municipality’s entry into bankruptcy 
than facilitates it.191 
Pennsylvania officials’ behavior in the face of the city of Harrisburg’s 
bankruptcy filing is a prime example of a state seeking to avoid municipal 
bankruptcy out of fear and misunderstanding. Knowing that Harrisburg was 
considering filing for chapter 9, Pennsylvania lawmakers quickly passed a 
law barring bankruptcy for all cities of the third class, which included 
 
 
 186. When bondholders in other municipalities observe an inability to make a promised payment, 
they might insist upon a higher interest rate to reflect the political risk. See Frank Shafroth, Can Default 
be Contagious?, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Aug. 7, 2015), https://fiscal 
bankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/08/10/can-default-be-contagious/ (describing this practice in the 
context of Puerto Rico and Chicago). 
 187. See, e.g., supra Part III.B (discussing the situation in Bridgeport, Connecticut).  
 188. For a fuller discussion on bankruptcy and credit downgrades, see STEPHEN A. STOWE ET AL., 
SAMSON CAPITAL ADVISORS, UPDATE ON MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCIES AND MULTI-NOTCH 
DOWNGRADES (Nov. 29, 2011) http://www.fierausa.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Bulletin-Update-
on-Municipal-Bankruptcies-and-Multi-Notch-Downgrades-11.29.11.pdf. 
 189. See Coordes, supra note 19 for a fuller discussion of this issue. 
 190. Kentucky is a recent example of a state that has expressed a need for some guidance in this 
area. See Frank Shafroth, On the Edge of Municipal Bankruptcy, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT 
(Jan. 21, 2016), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2016/01/21/on-the-edge-of-municipal-
bankruptcy/ (describing one Kentucky official’s proposal to conduct a study of municipal bankruptcy, 
including laws and practices used by other states). 
 191. See, e.g., Charles E. Ramirez & Steve Pardo, Evans to State: Declare Fiscal Emergency in 
Wayne County, DETROIT NEWS (Jun. 17, 2015, 11:23 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/ 
local/wayne-county/2015/06/17/wayne-county-financial-emergency/28886293/ (quoting a local 
educator describing Michigan’s authorization mechanisms as a “lengthy, complicated process”). 
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Harrisburg.192 Some observers speculated that the law’s primary purpose 
was to serve as a stop-gap measure, preventing the “damage” Pennsylvania 
feared Harrisburg would have caused if it had been able to access chapter 9 
relief.193 
Harrisburg’s story does not end there, however. In defiance of the law, 
Harrisburg’s city council filed for bankruptcy anyway, but the state objected 
to Harrisburg’s filing.194 Despite the court’s finding that Harrisburg was 
clearly not authorized to file for bankruptcy, it took six weeks (and plenty 
of lawyers) for Harrisburg’s case to be dismissed.195 Nine days after 
Harrisburg filed for chapter 9, Pennsylvania’s governor amended the state’s 
Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, giving Harrisburg’s mayor and city 
council thirty days to come up with a state-approved recovery plan outside 
of bankruptcy.196 If Harrisburg failed to implement a plan within that time, 
the act authorized the governor to appoint a receiver to take over the city’s 
finances.197 In essence, Pennsylvania officials desperately sought 
Harrisburg’s extrication from the bankruptcy system and even went so far 
as to impose on the city a hastily created state substitute. In this way, 
Pennsylvania’s government failed to recognize the unique form of help 
Harrisburg was seeking and the distinct benefits that bankruptcy could have 
provided for the city. By seeking to force Harrisburg out of bankruptcy at 
any cost, state officials passed several laws that lacked long-term 
perspective and will likely deter other Pennsylvania cities from considering 
bankruptcy in the future.  
D. Rhetoric 
The rhetoric surrounding a municipal bankruptcy filing further 
discourages municipalities from considering bankruptcy relief. As 
previously discussed, both chapter 9’s legislative history and modern 
commentary consistently refer to chapter 9 as a “last resort.”198 Yet, as 
 
 
 192. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1601-D.1(a) (2015); Schleppegrell, supra note 161, at 49. Pennsylvania 
law also provides that, if a city filed for bankruptcy, all funding from the state would be suspended. 72 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1601-D.1(c). 
 193. Schleppegrell, supra note 161, at 49 (noting that “[i]f there was a long-term strategy, it is not 
apparent”).  
 194. Id. 
 195. See generally Moringiello, supra note 79 (describing Harrisburg’s bankruptcy filing and noting 
that it was dismissed six weeks after the case was filed). 
 196. Mark G. Douglas, Jones Day, Is Chapter 9 the Next Chapter in the Municipal Saga?, JONES 
DAY PUBS. (Nov./Dec. 2011), http://www.jonesday.com/is-chapter-9-the-next-chapter-in-the-
municipal-saga-12-01-2011/. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See supra Part II.A.  
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scholars have recently revealed in the context of chapter 11 bankruptcies, 
this “last resort” mentality can prevent debtors who need federal relief from 
pursuing it out of fear of failure.199 Indeed, municipal bankruptcy, rather 
than being viewed as a discrete tool that can help a municipality avoid 
failure in some circumstances, is too often seen as an admission of failure 
itself.200 Too many state, city, and even federal officials view bankruptcy as 
part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The fear of what would 
happen if the United States granted Puerto Rico or its municipalities access 
to bankruptcy represents this view exactly. 
In fact, the debate around Puerto Rico captured both sides of the 
misunderstanding: Republicans argued that bankruptcy would not solve all 
of Puerto Rico’s difficulties,201 while Democrats suggested that bankruptcy 
would provide a “way out of Puerto Rico’s economic crisis.”202 In fact, 
neither side is completely correct. Bankruptcy alone will not resolve the 
situation in Puerto Rico, which is facing problems far beyond those 
correctable by a debt adjustment, such as population loss, drought, and 
governmental mismanagement.203 But just because bankruptcy is not a 
complete solution does not mean that it should not be considered as a viable 
way forward.204 While both sides debated the merits of possible solutions, 
Puerto Rico, which was unable to use the possibility of a bankruptcy filing 
as leverage with its creditors, saw negotiations drag on, impeding the 
territory’s economic recovery.205 
Too often, bankruptcy is misconceived as a failure of municipal 
government. But in reality, bankruptcy is a mechanism that helps 
government overcome failure; it is not a failure in and of itself. Bankruptcy 
is a specific fix to specific problems, but if it is not utilized when needed, 
there can be devastating consequences. Bankruptcy takes time, effort, 
 
 
 199. Harner & Griffin, supra note 117, at 228. 
 200. Christopher J. Tyson, Exploring the Boundaries of Municipal Bankruptcy, 50 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 661, 663 (2014). 
 201. See, e.g., Billy House, Puerto Rico Advisory Board Backed by House Panel Leader, BNA 
BANKR. L. REP. Oct. 8, 2015, 27 BKY 1339 (“It has to be clear that bankruptcy is not the panacea here.” 
(quoting Rep. Tom Marino, Chairman, H. Judiciary Comm. on Regulatory Reform)).  
 202. Erica Werner, Leading House Republicans Declare Opposition to Bankruptcy Protections for 
Puerto Rico, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 8, 2015, 5:32 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
politics/articles/2015/07/08/house-gop-opposes-bankruptcy-protections-for-puerto-rico. 
 203. See Shafroth, supra note 152 (raising some of these problems). 
 204. Id. (discussing bankruptcy for Puerto Rico). 
 205. Vicente Feliciano, Detroit and Puerto Rico, A Tale of Two Issuers, HILL, (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:00 
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/251771-detroit-and-puerto-rico-a-tale-of-two-
issuers. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1191 
 
 
 
 
money, and resources in order to work.206 As an analogy, consider the fact 
that in the chapter 11 context, law firm reorganizations are exceedingly 
rare.207 This is because, once a law firm begins to struggle, employees leave 
the firm, taking their assets (clients) with them. By the time the firm is in 
truly desperate straits, it does not have the resources to reorganize in chapter 
11 and must liquidate instead. A similar story is playing out in the municipal 
context: struggling municipalities are seeing residents, employees, and 
businesses walk away in the face of city distress, and if a municipality does 
not take specific steps to reverse course, there will be no resources left for 
the city to utilize in a bankruptcy proceeding.208  
Even without the federal eligibility requirements, many municipalities 
that could benefit from chapter 9 will refrain from filing due to concerns 
over negative stigma, political roadblocks, or inability to meet state 
requirements.209 The city of Flint, Michigan provides a vivid example of the 
extreme measures a municipality might take to avoid declaring bankruptcy. 
In a cost-saving attempt to avoid bankruptcy, Flint switched its water supply 
from a source in Detroit to the Flint River.210 The cheaper supply, however, 
brought an unexpected cost of a different nature: high lead levels in the 
water that ended up in residents’ taps created health problems for many 
residents, including children, and led the mayor to declare a state of 
emergency for the city.211 Although deterrence of opportunistic bankruptcy 
filings and encouragement of careful deliberation prior to filing are worthy 
goals, the current eligibility rules elevate these goals to the point where 
access to bankruptcy is often blocked or desperately avoided, even when it 
is most needed.212 
When Congress designed chapter 9, its members expressed concern 
 
 
 206. Cf., e.g., Wayne State Univ., Center for the Study of Citizenship – Detroit Bankruptcy 
Discussion, YOUTUBE (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtBgJkxUsow (“Without a 
tax base, we’re rearranging—once again!—the deck chairs on the Titanic.”). 
 207. See generally Edward S. Adams, Lessons from Law Firm Bankruptcies and Proposals for 
Reform, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 507 (2015) (describing five large law firms that ultimately collapsed 
or dissolved instead of reorganizing). 
 208. Indeed, rising pension expenditures often leave taxpayers in the position of having to 
effectively “pay more for past government services while getting less and less in the way of current 
services,” potentially driving taxpayers out of the municipality. See Stephen Eide, Pension Armageddon, 
WKLY. STANDARD (Jun. 29, 2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/pension-
armageddon_974083.html. 
 209. Vazquez, supra note 69, at *13. 
 210. A Return to Flint, Where the Mayor Has Declared a State of Emergency, KNKX 88.5 (Dec. 
19, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://knkx.org/post/return-flint-where-mayor-has-declared-state-emergency. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Eide, supra note 208; see also Jacoby, supra note 139, at 851 (“The cloud of potential 
ineligibility can stall negotiations with creditors and make it impossible to complete some 
transactions.”). 
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about preventing opportunistic filings.213 To alleviate this concern, 
Congress erected multiple statutory safeguards.214 However, given the 
harms that can arise from drawn-out eligibility battles, or the fear of them, 
it is time to recognize that some of Congress’s precautions could be 
eliminated without opening the floodgates for opportunistic filers.215 
There are often good reasons for a municipality to avoid filing for 
bankruptcy. Perhaps it has few creditors, and those creditors are willing to 
negotiate. Perhaps it has debts, but it can still provide basic services to its 
residents. Regardless, there are times when federal relief is needed, and 
when that is the case, the path to bankruptcy should be straightforward. This 
Part has shown that the current eligibility rules create unnecessary obstacles 
that can be insurmountable to even the neediest municipality and provide 
easy avenues for creditors and the state to create further roadblocks. On the 
other hand, to the extent that courts do interpret these rules to allow access 
to bankruptcy, the rules can be reduced to meaningless technicalities. 
Chapter 9 offers unique advantages that are not readily available at the state 
level.216 The eligibility rules should thus be re-assessed in light of two goals: 
deterrence of federal relief when it is not necessary, and access to relief 
when it is needed. The next Part discusses specific modifications to the 
eligibility rules to achieve these results. 
IV. A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ELIGIBILITY 
In a world without any eligibility requirements, a municipality still 
would not rush into bankruptcy due to the rigorous and resource-intensive 
challenges it will face once in chapter 9. It is therefore plausible that the 
eligibility rules might be eliminated entirely without raising concerns over 
opportunistic filings. This Part discusses the benefits and drawbacks of 
eliminating the eligibility rules and proposes a set of manageable reforms to 
the eligibility process. Drawing on the analyses from the previous Parts, this 
Part demonstrates how a fresh take on eligibility can match a bankruptcy 
solution with particular problems that distressed municipalities face. 
As the previous Parts have shown, although chapter 9 is intended to be 
 
 
 213. See generally Hunt, supra note 149.  
 214. See id.at 522 (describing four such safeguards). 
 215. See Coordes, supra note 19 (describing the harms of chapter 9 eligibility proceedings). 
 216. Barson & Lawall, supra note 118, at *1 (“[I]n discrete instances, the obvious and compelling 
advantages of Chapter 9 from a distressed municipal finance perspective outweigh the disadvantages . . 
. the Chapter 9 process may offer a genuinely viable restructuring alternative for the adjustment of 
historical obligations that cannot otherwise be accomplished on a fully consensual basis.”). 
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an orderly process,217 the current eligibility rules complicate matters to the 
point where municipalities may decide to avoid seeking relief entirely rather 
than endure the onerous eligibility procedures. This result indicates that the 
chapter 9 system is not being used nearly as much as it could be. New 
eligibility rules should enable municipalities to harness bankruptcy’s toolkit 
when they face problems that bankruptcy can best help them resolve. 
Additionally, the eligibility rules need not reinforce the concept of 
municipal bankruptcy as a last resort because strong incentives, including 
high transaction and political costs, already exist to discourage filing. The 
following subsections describe specific reforms for four of the five 
eligibility requirements. Because the municipality requirement is not an 
obstacle for the general-purpose municipalities that are the subject of this 
Article, no changes are recommended for that requirement. 
A. The Insolvency Requirement 
The insolvency requirement could be eliminated entirely if a few 
changes are made at the plan confirmation stage. Currently, the insolvency 
requirement is focused on the debtor’s failure or inability to pay debts as 
they become due, an inquiry that is fact-intensive, time-consuming, and 
often leads to litigation.218 The justification for the insolvency requirement 
is the concern that municipalities must be in serious financial distress that 
is unlikely to be resolved without the use of the bankruptcy power’s 
exclusive ability to impair contracts.219 Yet, if a city does not have debt that 
can be adjusted in chapter 9, it has little reason to file for bankruptcy in the 
first place.220 The insolvency requirement may therefore not be doing much 
work at the eligibility stage. 
Because the insolvency requirement tells the judge little about the 
municipality at the eligibility stage and is instead a prime source for delay 
 
 
 217. See José Vázquez Barquet, Puerto Rico’s Private Sector Calls for Chapter 9, HUFFINGTON 
POST: BLOG (Aug. 20, 2015, 6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-josa-vazquez-
barquet/puerto-ricos-private-sector-calls-for-chapter-9_b_8017848.html (“Chapter 9 would provide an 
orderly legal process—guided by a federal judge—to restructure . . . .”). 
 218. Henry C. Kevane, Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy: The New “New Thing”? Part I, BUS. L. 
TODAY, May 2011, at 1, 3. 
 219. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 220. The imposition of the automatic stay would arguably help cities stop some bothersome 
lawsuits, even if they do not have a debt overhang problem. Thus, it is conceivable that a solvent city 
could take advantage of a filing to buy time even if it never intended on confirming a bankruptcy plan. 
This could give the city additional bargaining leverage against creditors before filing. Yet, the political 
costs associated with a bankruptcy filing may yet deter many cities in this position from filing. 
Furthermore, it is worth considering whether this sort of bargaining power, which is already available 
to corporations in chapter 11, ought to be made available to municipalities anyway. 
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and expense, insolvency should instead be examined at the confirmation 
stage, after additional information is disclosed about the municipality’s 
financial position. Specifically, an additional confirmation standard could 
be included requiring the judge to approve a plan only if the debtor meets 
the definition of insolvency as defined in § 101(32)(C) of the Bankruptcy 
Code.221 Adding this confirmation standard eliminates the need for an 
insolvency eligibility rule, because cities that do not meet the confirmation 
standard would have little to gain from filing. 
Placing the insolvency consideration at the confirmation stage is sensible 
because a consideration of insolvency goes hand-in-hand with many of the 
other confirmation requirements.222 For example, a determination of 
whether a plan is in the best interests of the creditors and is feasible within 
the meaning of § 943 requires a consideration of whether the city’s existing 
debt payments leave the city ineligible to maintain basic services and 
whether the proposed plan payments put the city in a better position to do 
so. Thus, a determination of how much debt can be cut back at the 
confirmation stage necessitates a determination of the point at which the 
city will likely be able to provide basic services. The city of San Bernardino, 
California, has faced these exact inquiries as part of its plan disclosure and 
approval process.223 
In short, confirmation requirements eliminate the need for an insolvency 
inquiry at the initial stage of a municipal bankruptcy. As the previous Part 
has illustrated, rather than encouraging careful deliberation before filing, the 
insolvency requirement may incentivize cities to file too late, after capital 
sources have begun to disappear.  
The current insolvency requirement is also somewhat of a false hurdle, 
 
 
 221. This section states: “The term ‘insolvent’ means . . . with reference to a municipality, financial 
condition such that the municipality is (i) generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such 
debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (ii) unable to pay its debts as they become due.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(32)(C) (2012). 
 222. See, e.g., Ryan Hagen, Bankruptcy Judge: San Bernardino Must Provide More Information, 
SAN BERNARDINO CTY. SUN (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.sbsun.com/article/LG/20151008/ 
NEWS/151009506 (describing the common practice of hearings on the adequacy of the plan disclosure 
statement to conclude that more information is needed and how the judge in San Bernardino’s case 
“wanted more information to show that the city’s plan wouldn’t lead to it collapsing into a second 
bankruptcy in a few years”); see also In re Mt. Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1999) (“The insolvency test measures whether a municipality can pay for the services it provides. . . . 
[I]t would make little sense to confirm a reorganization plan which does not remedy the problem.”). 
 223. See Frank Shafroth, Fiscal Chaos & Municipal Bankruptcy, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT (Oct. 12, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/10/12/fiscal-chaos-municipal-
bankruptcy/ (describing bankruptcy judge Meredith Jury’s warning that San Bernardino must provide 
more extensive fiscal information to demonstrate its ability to avoid insolvency and emerge from chapter 
9). 
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because it is not rationally linked to the concerns driving a municipality’s 
entry into bankruptcy.224 Commentators today frequently refer to a “tipping 
point,” a point at which a city must make a choice between funding essential 
public services or maintaining access to capital by paying bondholders on 
time.225 Courts have also implicitly recognized the presence of a tipping 
point and the role chapter 9 can play in preventing a municipality from 
“tipping over.”226 Yet, the insolvency eligibility requirement, with its focus 
on a city’s balance sheet, may not accurately capture the full situation a 
municipality is facing, and may therefore block access to relief that is 
otherwise desperately needed. 
B. The Authorization Requirement 
The analysis in the previous Parts shows that bankruptcy can provide 
specific and unique relief to municipalities. It follows from this analysis that 
municipalities should be able to access bankruptcy law when the relief that 
bankruptcy specifically can provide is needed. 
The requirement that a municipality be specifically authorized by its 
state before it can file for bankruptcy creates, for many municipalities, two 
sets of hurdles: those the state erects as part of its authorization process, and 
the federal eligibility rules that are the subject of this Article. Complicating 
matters is the fact that the state approval process is often a political 
endeavor, meaning the municipality must receive approval to file from a 
political official or body, such as the governor or state finance council. 
Getting this approval can amplify the difficulties a municipality is facing 
because, as previously discussed, political actors are often inclined to delay 
or prohibit a bankruptcy filing. For this reason, making the state 
authorization process less of a political exercise would likely help 
municipalities gain access to bankruptcy relief.227 
Although the state authorization requirement is primarily a result of the 
fact that municipalities’ authority to operate derives from the state, the state 
authorization process can serve as a significant and expensive roadblock for 
 
 
 224. See Hunt, supra note 149, at 546 (footnote omitted) (“Demonstrating insolvency under the 
Code requires something more than showing that the debtor is in financial trouble, but exactly what that 
‘something more’ is has proven more difficult to define.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Frank Shafroth, Is Puerto Rico at the Tipping Point?, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT (Jun. 30, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/06/30/971/. 
 226. See, for example, supra Part III.B, regarding the Bridgeport bankruptcy.  
 227. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 45 at Ch. 2 (discussing preferences for state administrative, 
rather than state legislative, oversight of city decisionmaking); see also Buccola, supra note 171, 
(manuscript at 26) (noting instability of state law concerning eligibility). 
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bankruptcy relief. This Article therefore posits that the role of the state in 
the municipal eligibility process needs to be re-assessed. There are two 
possibilities this Article envisions: eliminate the state authorization process 
entirely, or modify the role of the state so that it is a predictor of a 
municipality’s distress, rather than a gatekeeper into bankruptcy. As 
explained below, it would be preferable to remove the state authorization 
requirement altogether; however, concerns about federal law encroaching 
the powers of the states may make elimination of the authorization 
requirement practically unachievable.228 
The plan confirmation requirement of authorization by law arguably 
eliminates the need for a state authorization consideration at the eligibility 
stage.229 Specifically, chapter 9 allows a plan to be confirmed only if 
regulatory or electoral approval necessary under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law (state law) has been obtained.230 The Supreme Court appeared to 
recognize the duplicative nature of the authorization eligibility and 
confirmation requirements in Bekins v. United States, noting that the 
confirmation safeguard required the debtor to be authorized by law to fulfill 
its plan of adjustment.231 And indeed, sections 903 and 904 of the 
Bankruptcy Code require the municipality to act consistently with state law 
the entire time it is in chapter 9.232 As Skeel and Gillette have noted, the 
legislative history to chapter 9 suggests that state authorization does not 
have its roots in a constitutional limitation but rather in a political effort to 
convince the Supreme Court that the federal government was not interested 
 
 
 228. Others have discussed the idea that the Supreme Court could permit the elimination of the state 
authorization requirement. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 171, (manuscript at 43). 
 229. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49 (1938) (“It is immaterial, if the consent of the 
State is not required to make the federal plan effective, and it is equally immaterial if the consent of the 
state has been given . . . . It should also be observed that [the bankruptcy statute] provides as a condition 
of confirmation of a plan…that it must appear that the petitioner ‘is authorized by law to take all action 
necessary to be taken by it to carry out the plan,’ and, if the judge is not satisfied on that point as well as 
on the others mentioned, he must enter an order dismissing the proceeding. The phrase ‘authorized by 
law’ manifestly refers to the law of the State.”); see also James Spiotto, Reducing Risk to Payment of 
State and Local Government Debt Obligations, Statutory Liens from Rhode Island to California SB222, 
MUNINET GUIDE (Jul. 28, 2015), http://muninetguide.com/reducing-risk-to-payment-of-state-and-local-
government-debt-obligations-statutory-liens-from-rhode-island-to-california-sb222/ (“Further, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Bekins . . . in implementing any plan of debt adjustment, 
the municipality must comply with state law, and clearly the municipality cannot in its implementation 
of its plan or in taking action in the Chapter 9 act contrary to state law."). 
 230. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(6) (2012); see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1200–01 (discussing 
11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4)). 
 231. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 49. 
 232. Spiotto, supra note 229 (“The fact that a municipality may file for Chapter 9 does not allow 
the municipality to act contrary to that state law mandate as Section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code requires 
that state law be honored.”). 
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in interfering with the states.233 Thus, the concern driving the state 
authorization eligibility requirement—that bankruptcy threatens the state’s 
authority over its municipalities and therefore, states must consent to 
municipal bankruptcy—is not, in fact, as great as it may seem.234  
Arguments thus exist for eliminating the state authorization requirement 
entirely, as the state’s interests are adequately protected throughout the 
chapter 9 process and particularly at the plan confirmation stage. 
Nevertheless, it is often critical, as a practical matter, for the municipality 
to have the support of the state in order for it to successfully navigate the 
bankruptcy process.235 The case of Bridgeport, Connecticut, provides a 
visible example of what can happen if a city lacks state support in chapter 
9: the state objected strenuously to Bridgeport’s chapter 9 filing and 
ultimately, the case was dismissed.236 Even if a state is unsuccessful in 
advocating for dismissal of a bankruptcy case, if the state and the 
municipality are working at cross purposes, the bankruptcy process as a 
whole may slow down.237 In certain cases, as with Detroit’s bankruptcy, the 
state’s cooperation is essential to the municipality’s ability to successfully 
exit bankruptcy.238 Finally, as discussed in Part I, what happens at the state 
level necessarily impacts the municipality, so some state involvement in the 
municipality’s bankruptcy is desirable so that the state can facilitate relief 
at the municipal level. 
Although state involvement may be important in a municipal 
bankruptcy, the state’s role as gatekeeper is largely unnecessary as a 
practical matter because the stigma on the municipality of filing for 
bankruptcy and the costs of the bankruptcy process itself already deter 
filings to a significant extent. If the state is to retain a role in determining a 
 
 
 233. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1168–69. 
 234. Id. at 1221 (“[T]he threat that municipal restructuring poses to the state’s plenary authority 
over its political subdivisions is perhaps more limited than initially appears to be the case.”). 
 235. Additionally, it is not clear whether removal of the state authorization requirement entirely 
would comport with the Supreme Court’s historically protective stance toward states’ rights. Yet, the 
Court has been clear that the Bankruptcy Code preempts state bankruptcy processes for their 
municipalities, suggesting that the state’s role in this area must be at least somewhat limited. See 
generally Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). Additional analysis is 
needed to fully explore the extent to which the state’s role may be reduced or eliminated; however, 
because this Article proposes only a voluntary reduction in a state’s role through adoption of a model 
mechanism, such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 236. See supra Part III.B.  
 237. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1221 (“Even within bankruptcy, the state is likely to play a 
significant role in formulating the plan . . . . [T]he state will typically be the source of substantial capital 
infusions that will be necessary to make any plan feasible.”). 
 238. See Shafroth, supra note 186 (describing Michigan’s assistance with Detroit’s first post-
bankruptcy bond issuance). 
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municipality’s entry into bankruptcy, that role should be one of predictor of 
distress rather than gatekeeper. Although, as previously described, state 
officials may not be particularly well suited to facilitating a municipality’s 
access to bankruptcy, they are in a good position to evaluate the distress of 
their cities and towns. This Article therefore proposes that the Uniform Law 
Commission (ULC) give the states better guidance on how to perform their 
predictor role by designing a model authorization mechanism that states can 
adopt and customize as needed.239 
The proposed model mechanism would grant state authorization when 
there is a determination by a state-appointed bankruptcy expert (or panel of 
experts) that a municipality is in need of relief to overcome holdout creditors 
and collective action problems.240 Once this expert241 determines that a 
municipality is facing problems that bankruptcy can best resolve, the expert, 
on the State’s behalf, should authorize the municipality’s bankruptcy 
filing.242 
The specific details of a model state authorization mechanism would 
undoubtedly be subject to extensive debate, and the costs that the state 
would bear would likely be determined on a state-by-state basis, depending 
on the desired involvement of the appointed expert. Yet, any model 
authorization mechanism should ideally have two key components: (1) an 
assessment of the municipality’s problems by a bankruptcy expert; and (2) 
 
 
 239. See Buccola, supra note 171, (manuscript at 43) (“Under modern understandings, Congress 
might well be able to create universal eligibility as it has done with respect to another kind of state-
chartered entity, namely the business corporation.”). 
 240. The idea of using a panel of experts to oversee a municipality in distress is not new; however, 
the suggestions for such a panel’s use to date have been concentrated on managing the municipality after 
it is in distress, rather than utilizing the panel as a predictor or preventer of distress. See, e.g., OBAMA 
WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, ADDRESSING PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CRISIS AND CREATING 
A PATH TO RECOVERY: ROADMAP FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 3 (2015), https://Obama 
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/roadmap_for_congressional_action___puerto_rico_final.pd
f (noting that “Congress should provide independent fiscal oversight” for Puerto Rico “to ensure Puerto 
Rico adheres to its plan and fully implements proposed reforms”); History of OCFO, OFFICE OF THE 
CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, http://cfo.dc.gov/page/history-ocfo (describing the creation of the District of 
Columbia Financial Control Board in 1995 to oversee the District’s finances when it was in distress). 
 241. In terms of determining who this expert should be and how he or she is appointed, California’s 
authorization statute may provide some guidance. The statute requires the appointment of an experienced 
neutral evaluator to oversee negotiations prior to a bankruptcy filing. Cal. Gov. Code § 53760, 53760.3 
(Jan. 1, 2013). Although the statute has some drawbacks, the mechanism for identifying a neutral 
evaluator to predict distress may be useful to States in determining the appointment of a neutral expert. 
 242. Freyberg, supra note 17, at 1002, has advocated for the establishment of uniform laws 
“designed to avert bankruptcy under Chapter 9 before it occurs.” A key difference between Freyberg’s 
proposal and the model state authorization mechanism discussed here lies in the purpose of each 
proposed uniform law. While Freyberg’s law would seek to avoid municipal bankruptcy, the model 
mechanisms proposed here would seek first to determine whether municipal bankruptcy is an 
appropriate relief mechanism and, if so, would then facilitate access to bankruptcy. 
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that expert’s identification of the specific problems that bankruptcy relief 
can best alleviate as the trigger for authorization. Procedures for appointing 
the expert or expert panel could also be included in the model law. In this 
way, the use of a bankruptcy expert should provide some shield from 
political influences and will also help with the identification and 
classification of a municipality’s problems, which will likely take numerous 
forms. Depending on the size of the state, a state may elect to utilize a panel 
of experts, or assign experts to particular regions. Questions that the 
bankruptcy expert should consider ought to reflect the survey of distress 
sources outlined in Part I and should specifically assess the type of debt the 
city has; how, if at all, the chapter 9 process would modify that debt; 
whether the city faced a choice of meeting debt payments or paying for 
services (thus further rendering an insolvency question moot); the size of 
the debt; and how much of the city’s long-term problems would be resolved 
if the debt were reduced or eliminated.243 
Model laws are not unusual; in fact, the ULC exists to provide states with 
legislation in areas of law that require uniformity among the states and 
territories.244 Its members are appointed by the fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.245 The ULC drafts 
legislation and proposes model and uniform laws, such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Uniform Probate Code, to the states.246 States 
have the option of adopting these laws in full, adopting them with 
modifications, or rejecting them altogether. In the chapter 9 context, a model 
law on state authorization mechanisms would represent clear, much-needed 
guidance on when bankruptcy will best aid municipalities.247 As discussed, 
current state authorization laws are often driven by fear and politics rather 
than sound strategy. 
By establishing national rules, the ULC helps provide predictability and 
uniformity in areas where disparity creates problems.248 The ULC drafters 
 
 
 243. Another possible option may be to allow for involuntary bankruptcy in chapter 9 by permitting 
creditors to petition the state for the municipality to file for bankruptcy. The expert/panel’s approval 
process for the involuntary bankruptcy could incorporate elements of § 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 303 (2012). I am grateful to Michelle Harner and Vince Buccola for these insights. 
 244. See Cam Ward, Uniform Law Commission Concludes 116th Annual Meeting, 68 ALA. LAW. 
441, 441 (2007). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. The specific development and promulgation of the model law should undergo a process similar 
to the development and promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code. Legal organizations could aid 
in the further development of the model rule provided here, and once the rule is finalized and published, 
coordinated efforts could be made to encourage the states to adopt the rule. 
 248. Barbara A. Atwood, The Uniform Law Commission: Its Continuing Relevance to Arizona, 
ARIZ. ATT’Y, Apr. 2009, at 30. 
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have also demonstrated considerable prowess in balancing creditor and 
debtor rights in the specific context of commercial law, through the creation 
of the Uniform Commercial Code.249 Similarly, the ULC, in creating 
uniform laws for state authorization, may also prove adept at incorporating 
some protections for creditors, so that creditor concerns about 
municipalities being given free rein to trample on their rights in bankruptcy 
proceedings are somewhat alleviated. 
Although states may resist adopting a model law that casts them in the 
“lesser” role of predictor, the model law still provides for an active role for 
the state and gives the state concrete guideposts as to when a municipality 
is best-suited to file for bankruptcy. The proposed model law would also 
promote consistency across states. By encouraging experts to identify 
specific problems that bankruptcy is uniquely positioned to resolve, the 
model provision is designed to encourage states to accept, rather than fear, 
bankruptcy. This will arguably create a more desirable result than allowing 
states to devise their own debt composition laws in lieu of bankruptcy, as 
bankruptcy law provides a set of uniform standards and safeguards (e.g., 
requiring a neutral judge to oversee the process), which increase 
predictability and diminish concerns over moral hazard.  
Any changes to the state authorization requirement necessitate a 
consideration of the federalism concerns underlying the requirement. The 
ULC is particularly well-suited to address these considerations as well, as it 
has a long and proven history of supporting principles of federalism and of 
addressing concerns about the distribution of power between the states and 
the federal government.250 Indeed, the uniform and model acts promulgated 
by the ULC have helped to promote and preserve federalism across legal 
disciplines.251 Thus, the ULC is particularly well-suited to intervene in this 
area of law, which has provoked federalism concerns from its inception.252 
States currently have various, complicated authorization mechanisms in 
place due to largely unfounded fears of contagion and a lack of guidance as 
to the discrete role bankruptcy is supposed to play in the resolution of their 
municipalities’ fiscal distress. As a result, many of the requirements states 
 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION 146 (2013) (describing the ULC”s “Federalism Committee”).  
 251. Id. at 234 (“It is not an overstatement to say that the mission of the Uniform Law Commission 
is to maintain and strengthen ‘federalism’ in the United States.”).  
 252. See id. (“When there is a need for federal legislation concerning matters that the states also 
regulate . . . the Conference works through interactive governmental processes to forge cooperative 
solutions that allocate power and responsibility in a way that maintains a healthy balance of federal and 
state law.”); see also discussion of Ashton and Bekins, supra Part II.  
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have designed reflect a poor understanding of the role chapter 9 is supposed 
to play for a distressed municipality. These state programs and mechanisms 
block access to chapter 9 relief when such relief would be appropriate. 
Designing a model authorization mechanism that focuses on the core 
purposes of federal bankruptcy relief will provide guidance to states as to 
when bankruptcy can be a viable solution for a municipality’s problems. 
C. The Creditor Negotiation Requirement 
The creditor negotiation requirement may be a large obstacle for a 
municipality, as when many creditors object that the debtor has not 
negotiated in good faith. Conversely, it may not be an obstacle at all, as 
when a judge determines that negotiation would be impractical for the 
municipality. At the heart of the creditor negotiation requirement is the 
question of whether a municipality is truly facing holdout and collective 
action problems, a question this Article posits is best determined by state-
appointed experts.253 Furthermore, the considerations used to determine 
whether this requirement is met primarily focus on the debtor’s behavior, 
asking whether the debtor has negotiated in good faith, or whether the 
debtor has achieved an agreement with creditors. The bankruptcy judge 
already has ample opportunity to make a determination on the debtor’s good 
faith, due both to the judge’s ability to dismiss the case if it is not filed in 
good faith and to the confirmation requirements that the plan be proposed 
in good faith and be in the best interest of creditors. 
Practically speaking, the creditor negotiation requirement primarily 
gives creditors a tool to further impede a municipality’s entry into 
bankruptcy that is not rationally linked to the concerns driving the eligibility 
requirements.254 Creditors can simply argue that a municipality has not 
negotiated enough while refusing to make any concessions themselves, and 
their arguments nearly always receive consideration, because there is almost 
always more that the debtor can do.255 Although the creditor negotiation 
requirement was designed to ensure that municipalities do not rush into 
bankruptcy, evidence from current practice indicates that the opposite is 
occurring. Municipalities are delaying entry into bankruptcy to pursue 
negotiations that they know will be fruitless simply so that they will be able 
 
 
 253. See supra Part IV.B.  
 254. See John T. Gregg, Eligibility of Municipalities for Relief Under 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5), AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., June 2011, at 30 (noting that municipalities have encountered great difficulty when 
attempting to prove that they have satisfied the creditor negotiation requirement). 
 255. See, e.g., Galen, supra note 64, at 556 (describing SBPEA’s objection to San Bernardino’s 
bankruptcy). San Bernardino’s eligibility fight dragged on for almost a year. Id. at 557. 
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to demonstrate that they have met this requirement once they file for chapter 
9.256  
Thus, the creditor negotiation requirement seems to encourage over-
negotiation on the debtor’s part, without any parallel requirement that 
creditors negotiate in good faith. The creditor negotiation requirement 
should therefore be eliminated because there are already sufficient tests in 
place for the judge to determine whether the debtor has acted in good 
faith.257 
A “good faith negotiation” is typically interpreted to mean that the debtor 
has a plan, term sheet, or other outline when negotiating with creditors.258 
Yet, in practice, courts waive this requirement often enough that it lacks 
teeth.259 Instead of measuring good faith with respect to the debtor’s 
development of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) should provide a check on any 
bad faith with respect to the debtor. This provision allows the judge to 
dismiss a bankruptcy petition if it is not filed in good faith. This provision 
serves the same concerns underlying the current creditor negotiation 
requirement: it protects against the notion of the debtor filing for bankruptcy 
to thwart creditors, rather than to work with them. 
D. The Plan Requirement 
The requirement that a municipality desire to effect a plan to adjust its 
debts should also be eliminated, because it too serves the concerns that both 
the creditor negotiation requirement and § 921(c)’s good faith requirement 
are designed to protect. This requirement was designed to “ensure that the 
municipality has a genuine willingness to propose a plan of adjustment as 
opposed to filing a petition under Chapter 9 designed to delay or frustrate 
its creditors.”260 Once again, however, the threat of dismissal from § 921(c) 
and the confirmation requirement that a plan be proposed in good faith 
already safeguard this result. An additional layer of protection only serves 
 
 
 256. See Tamar Frankel, Municipalities in Distress: A Preventative View, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 779, 793 (2014) (suggesting that negotiations be cabined within a time limit). 
 257. These tests include 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2012) (allowing the judge to dismiss the case if the 
debtor did not file the petition in good faith) and 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (requiring the plan to be in the 
best interests of the creditors). 
 258. Denniston, supra note 45, at 273–278 (describing the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s review of 
Vallejo’s compliance with this requirement). 
 259. Id. at 278 (noting that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel effectively gave Vallejo a pass, saying 
labor costs were the largest piece of the city’s budget, and “it would have been futile to negotiate with 
other creditors without an agreement with the unions” (quoting Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters, Local 1186 
v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vellejo), 408 B.R. 280, 298 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009)). This is the 
embodiment of a collective action problem. 
 260. Id. at 267. 
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as fertile ground for creditor objections that unnecessarily delay the case.  
In short, sufficient protections already exist for the concerns driving the 
eligibility requirements. The eligibility requirements, therefore, only serve 
to duplicate these protections and raise unnecessary roadblocks that impede 
access to bankruptcy and discourage qualified municipalities from filing. 
Regardless of whether this Article’s specific proposals are adopted, the key 
point is that the limitations on a municipality’s entry into bankruptcy must 
match up with the reasons the bankruptcy system exists. The current 
eligibility rules are far removed from chapter 9’s underlying purposes. It is 
therefore time to eliminate these unnecessary gatekeepers for good. 
E. Concerns and Criticisms 
Sweeping changes to the eligibility rules will necessarily invite 
resistance. This Subsection addresses anticipated critiques, explaining why 
the proposed modifications in particular will better serve the goals of 
bankruptcy law than the status quo. 
At the heart of this Article’s analysis is the hypothesis that, if the right 
confirmation standards exist, the eligibility rules serve no valuable purpose. 
In large part, this Article has argued that the right confirmation standards do 
in fact exist; however, where necessary, this Article has also suggested 
changes to the confirmation and eligibility considerations to facilitate 
significant modifications to the eligibility rules. Although these proposals 
may seem substantial, they are far from unprecedented. Indeed, the 
insolvency, good faith, and plan proposal requirements are all rooted in the 
Bankruptcy Act and once applied to all debtors seeking to file for 
bankruptcy.261 As times changed and the Bankruptcy Code replaced the 
Bankruptcy Act, these requirements were discarded for modern chapter 11 
debtors.262 Similarly, just because the eligibility requirements are rooted in 
legislative history does not mean that they cannot be modified if they no 
longer serve the purposes they were intended to serve for municipalities. 
The differences among municipalities and the diverse purposes of 
 
 
 261. See Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as 
Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 368–69 
(1993). 
 262. A similar debate over entry rules for corporations is taking place in Europe. See Horst 
Eidenmueller & Kristin van Zwieten, Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU 
Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency 1 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 301, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2662213 (arguing 
that proposed changes to European restructuring laws wrongly require evidence of financial difficulties 
or likelihood of insolvency as a condition of entry and noting that the restructuring process may be 
subject to abuse by sophisticated creditors). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2017] GATEKEEPERS GONE WRONG 1243 
 
 
 
 
bankruptcy law pose challenges to any modification of the eligibility rules. 
Even the general-purpose municipalities that serve as this Article’s focus 
are incredibly varied. Furthermore, scholars may disagree over the purposes 
bankruptcy in general, and municipal bankruptcy in particular, are designed 
to serve. Bankruptcy arguably can and does play a role beyond the primary 
purposes highlighted in this Article, and scholars have debated the merits of 
bankruptcy’s myriad roles for decades. Nevertheless, by focusing on 
municipal bankruptcy’s core attributes, this Article has delineated what 
chapter 9 does best and has isolated bankruptcy’s unique advantages. By 
focusing on bankruptcy’s unique, strong attributes, this Article provides 
guidance on how to shape the conversation about bankruptcy going forward. 
A related challenge lies in the dearth of chapter 9 cases to date. Only a 
handful of chapter 9 cases involving general-purpose municipalities has 
been filed, and each case, like each municipality, involves unique political 
considerations, judges, and problems. It is therefore admittedly difficult to 
draw generalizations about chapter 9’s “standard features.” Nevertheless, 
this Article has suggested concrete guidance for future cases and a novel 
attempt to provide stability and standardization going forward through the 
intervention of the ULC. If chapter 9 proves more useful in the future 
because of this Article’s suggestions, scholars will have even more fertile 
ground to analyze its use and suggest further refinements. This Article 
therefore plays a key role in articulating concrete steps for moving chapter 
9 into place as a viable and valuable bankruptcy tool.  
Facilitating entry into chapter 9 could have some undesirable 
consequences. For example, a city’s bond rating could drop.263 Making 
chapter 9 a more viable option could also create or exacerbate a moral 
hazard problem, whereby the stigma of bankruptcy erodes over time and 
municipal officials come to see bankruptcy as an easy escape from their 
problems.264 This in turn could raise the cost of capital, making it harder for 
cities to access funding sources. The transactional and political costs of a 
bankruptcy, however, should diminish concerns about moral hazard. Once 
a municipality enters bankruptcy, it faces a slew of costs and difficulties. 
 
 
 263. See generally Brown, supra note 110110 (discussing problems related to a lowered bond 
rating). Yet, studies of cities have also revealed that cooperation between the city and the state or 
between the city and its unions can actually have the opposite effect. For example, the city of Bridgeport, 
Connecticut’s finances deteriorated when the state and the city engaged in a political struggle and 
improved when the state and the city worked together. Id. The eligibility rules proposed above encourage 
the state and the city to work together by delineating chapter 9’s core, complementary function with 
respect to the state’s role in resolving municipal fiscal distress.  
 264. Cf. McConnell & Picker, supra note 151, at 426 (describing the moral hazard problem and the 
need for a legal regime strong enough to overcome this problem). 
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For example, a municipality must still demonstrate to a bankruptcy judge 
that it has complied with the standards for, for example, rejecting a 
contract,265 restructuring obligations, and otherwise compiling a plan of 
adjustment. This demonstration will take substantial effort and money in the 
form of payments to lawyers, financial experts, and other advisors. In 
essence, there are already numerous deterrence mechanisms in place, and 
eligibility rules do not need to serve as an additional source of deterrence.266 
Giving more access to the bankruptcy system itself, as this Article proposes, 
does not equate to giving municipalities a free ticket to bankruptcy relief. 
The confirmation proceedings and other statutory safeguards discussed in 
this Article will ensure that only those municipalities deserving of relief 
attain it. 
Although the powers of the judge in a municipal bankruptcy case seem 
limited, in practice, bankruptcy judges can serve as an effective backstop 
against opportunistic debtors. In municipal bankruptcy, § 903 prohibits the 
bankruptcy judge from changing the way that the city conducts its affairs. 
Creditors are also extremely limited in their remedies outside of bankruptcy, 
meaning that chapter 9 does not necessarily leave creditors worse off than 
they would be outside of bankruptcy.267 In fact, creditors may be better off 
with a bankruptcy solution, given that the judge must confirm a plan of 
adjustment that is fair, equitable, and in the best interests of creditors. These 
safeguards mean that there is no reason for a city to take advantage of 
bankruptcy if it does not really need it. Despite the judge’s overall power in 
bankruptcy being limited, the judge nevertheless exercises a substantial 
check on opportunistic or bad faith debtors when it comes to plan 
confirmation. Furthermore, although eliminating or paring down the 
eligibility rules may seem to present fewer opportunities for judicial 
oversight, in practice, judges have demonstrated ample informal means of 
overseeing the municipal bankruptcy process, and mechanisms remain for 
 
 
 265. Concerns about a city filing simply to rid itself of collective bargaining agreements may at first 
glance indicate a need for eligibility rules to prevent that result. Yet, an alternative approach would 
simply be to strengthen the protections for unions by making § 1113 applicable in chapter 9. Other 
scholars have discussed treatment of collective bargaining agreements in chapter 9 at length. See, e.g., 
Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45 (2011). 
 266. There is likely to be a marginal increase in concern over moral hazard with the elimination of 
eligibility rules because bankruptcy allows a city to avoid tough decisions, such as cutting luxury 
spending in order to fund basic needs. Still, this marginal increase will not entail a slew of new filings 
for the reasons described above. 
 267. For example, the public trust doctrine makes it very difficult for creditors to seize municipal 
assets. See John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in 
Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931 (2012). 
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creditors to appeal judicial decisions that they feel have needlessly harmed 
their rights.268 
Therefore, even with substantially revised or eliminated eligibility rules, 
a municipality’s journey through chapter 9 will not be costless. There are 
still sufficient mechanisms in the rest of chapter 9 for the municipality and 
the state to carefully contemplate the consequences of bankruptcy, and the 
role of the judge in safeguarding the municipality, its residents, and its 
creditors, is still very much preserved at the confirmation stage. Thus, 
despite facilitating entry into bankruptcy, the proposed eligibility 
modifications do not anticipate a frictionless journey through bankruptcy, 
nor do they reduce the costs of a bankruptcy exit.269 
Although bankruptcy may be seen as a catalyst for raising borrowing 
costs, alternatives to bankruptcy, such as default, raise borrowing costs as 
well. In thinking about the effects of bankruptcy, it is therefore critical to 
separate these effects from the effects of municipal distress more generally. 
For example, the appointment of an emergency manager due to fiscal 
distress may be viewed as a riskier move by rating agencies because of the 
loss of autonomy it could represent for the city.270 In bankruptcy, in contrast, 
municipal officials often remain in control of the municipality.271 
Finally, facilitating access to bankruptcy may be seen as allowing 
municipalities to unrestrainedly trample on pension and other employee 
obligations. Yet, the bankruptcies filed to date tell a different story about 
 
 
 268. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 77 at 81–82 (describing the extensive oversight of Judge Rhodes 
and mediator Judge Rosen in the Detroit bankruptcy); Debra McElligott, Post-Confirmation Powers: 
EDNY Bankruptcy Court Orders Government Entities to Act in In re Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting 
Corporation, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (Dec. 9, 2015), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil. 
com/chapter-9/post-confirmation-powers-edny-bankruptcy-court-orders-government-entities-to-act-in-
in-re-suffolk-regional-off-track-betting-corporation/ (describing the court’s expansive authority to help 
the debtor successfully implement its plan). 
 269. The same argument applies to concerns about eroding stable pensions and making it harder to 
attract good human capital. Although several courts have ruled that pensions can be cut in bankruptcy, 
the bankruptcies to date have been relatively gentle with pensions, either not touching them at all (as in 
Stockton) or making slight modifications (as in Detroit). In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 2015); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). Even if it was possible 
for easier access to bankruptcy to make it easier for pensions to be eroded, countervailing political 
pressures have not produced this result in municipal bankruptcies to date. Employees are not 
disproportionately hurt by municipal bankruptcies; if anything, as discussed infra, the bondholders often 
take a more significant cut than employees. 
 270. See Shafroth, supra note 225; see also Frank Shafroth, Exceptional Governance & 
Intergovernmental Challenges, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Apr. 12, 2016), https://fiscal 
bankruptcy.wordpress.com/2016/04/12/exceptional-governance-intergovernmental-challenges/ (noting 
that the Detroit public school system is suing emergency managers who are not responsive to 
constituents’ needs). 
 271. Shafroth, supra note 270 (contrasting a possible bankruptcy filing by Atlantic City with the 
possibility of a state takeover and raising questions about the constitutionality of the latter approach). 
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the treatment of employee obligations in bankruptcy. In the bankruptcies of 
Detroit, Vallejo, Stockton, and San Bernardino, for example, “bondholders 
have faced losses of up to 99% of their holdings.”272 Meanwhile, all three 
California cities chose to preserve full pensions for their employees, while 
Detroit only cut pensions by approximately 18%.273 Although pension cuts 
should not be minimized, it is notable that the most significant cuts fell on 
the bondholders, who, by virtue of their knowledge of the risks and ability 
to diversify their holdings, may arguably be better protected than 
employees.274 Of course, pension debt is a significant problem for many 
municipalities, and recent decisions indicate that chapter 9 can help address 
that debt.275 But chapter 9 does not provide a costless mechanism for 
municipalities to do so. And some have even suggested that a debtor’s 
ability to restructure pension obligations in bankruptcy will create needed 
incentives for beneficiaries to pressure leaders to keep their promises with 
regard to pension funding outside of the bankruptcy context.276 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 9 is not a solution to every type of municipal fiscal problem. 
Instead, the history and scholarship surrounding chapter 9 indicate that it 
can provide specific, targeted relief for certain types of fiscal distress. 
Modifying the eligibility rules in recognition of chapter 9’s strengths will 
ultimately serve to make chapter 9 a more effective tool, as well as enable 
access to municipal bankruptcy when it is needed most. 
The considerations underlying these modifications raise broader 
 
 
 272. Frank Shafroth, Protecting the Ability to Provide Essential Public Services, GMU MUN. 
SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (July 1, 2015), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/07/01/ 
protecting-the-ability-to-provide-essential-public-services/. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Shafroth, supra note 152 (describing comments from Moody’s noting a greater effect on 
bondholders and a lesser effect on pensions for municipal bankruptcy); see also Joe Mathewson, 
Opinion, Bankruptcy is the Only Way out, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015, 2:21 PM), 
http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/7/71/887897/opinion-bankruptcy-way. Some scholars argue that 
this should not be the case and is at odds with bankruptcy priority and distribution rules. See, e.g., Hynes 
& Walt, supra note 147, at 25 (arguing that the law does not allow a judge to approve a plan of 
adjustment that provides retirees and active workers a greater recovery than other creditors). 
 275. Specifically, two courts, those overseeing the bankruptcies of Detroit and Stockton, have now 
ruled that pensions can be impaired or cut in bankruptcy. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2013); In re City of Stockton, California, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).  
 276. David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (For People, Places, or Things)?, 
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2235 (2014) (“If . . . a debtor can restructure its pension obligations in 
bankruptcy, the beneficiaries and their representatives have an incentive to pay more attention to whether 
the promises are sustainable. They may put more pressure on politicians to fully fund the pensions than 
they do in a world where pensions cannot be altered.”). 
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questions about timing and access to the bankruptcy system in general.277 
Scholars have recognized that the Bankruptcy Code as a whole is 
underutilized and could help entities struggling with financial difficulties 
more often.278 By analyzing the role bankruptcy can play in conjunction 
with other fiscal relief mechanisms, scholars and policymakers can reach a 
better understanding of when and how bankruptcy should be utilized to 
resolve distress, whether municipal, corporate, or otherwise. 
 
 
 
 277. See generally Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381 
(2015) (discussing the need to ensure access to bankruptcy for all stakeholders). 
 278. See Harner & Griffin, supra note 117, at 243. 
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